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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
One of the most important problems facing a financial manager is that
of choosing from all the available investment projects that set whose
acquisition will enhance the value of the firm. That is, he must select
that set of proposals whose elements have income streams with a capitalized
value greater than their cost. Conversely, his problem is to choose those
projects whose cash flows, when discounted at that capitalization rate,
have a positive present value.
This problem can be separated into two parts - the determination of
the cash flow associated with each project and the discount or capitaliza-
tion rate to be used in computing the present value of these cash flows.
The major concern of this thesis is not with the former but with the
latter. Its purpose is to identify the factors determining the capitaliza-
tion rate and, more specifically, to separate these factors into those
associated with the physical assets in which the firm invests and the in-
come streams they generate, and those having their origin in the method
used to finance those assets.
If it would be possible to ascertain what forces influenced the rate
at which income streams to a specific firm were capitalized and the
mechanisms through which these forces acted, a major step would have been
taken toward the solution of the capital budgeting problem. Thus, this
thesis has as its focus the capitalization rate. It is meant to be both
a theoretical and empirical study, drawing on the relevant parts of
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economic analysis to construct a logical and (hopefully) relevant model,
and relying on statistical tests to determine its real world validity.
Much has been written concerning the manner in which firms oupht to
make investment decisions. While there is some difference of opinion as
to how the problem is to be formulated, there is widespread agreement on
the need for a required or cut-off rate of return. Thus, although the
linear programming approach to the capital budgeting problem was developed
primarily to deal with multiperiod outlays and the analysis of sets of
investments, and the straightforward computation of present values
usually considers investments as individual ventures, both formulations
of the problem require a rate of return as an input.—
This required rate of return or cut-off return for investment
projects is the weighted average cost of the debt and equity funds employed
to finance the project. Clearly, if the project generates a rate of re-
turn in excess of the cost of funds to finance its purchase, the value of
the firm will be increased. Projects yielding less than their cost have
the opposite effect. Therefore, the implementation of capital budgeting
i/see Weingartner, Martin, Mathematical Programming and the Analysis
of Capital Budgeting Decisions , Prentice-Hail, 1963; ~, Chames , A.,
iTal., ''Application of Linear Programming to Financial Budgeting and the
Costing of Funds," Journal of Business , January, 1959, for a presentation
of the linear programming vITw ; the discussion in The Capital Budgeting
Decision by H, Bierman, Jr.. ^nd S. Smidt, Macmillan, 1960, is represent-
ative of the analysis of independent projects with single period outlays.
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theory requires a knowledge of how this weighted average cost is
determined and what its magnitude is. For the individual firm, the
crucial problem is isolating the effects on the capitalization rate of
actions and variables it can control. Specifically, the important ques-
tion is whether the financial mix employed affects the weighted average
cost of capital, or whether this average is independent of the mix and
solely determined by the kind of physical assets in which the firm in-
vests. That is, given the type of assets in which the firm invests, is
it possible for the management of a firm to make a set of financial
decisions which will influence the weighted average costs of the debt
and equity funds employed by them? Restated in even another way, is
there any such thing as an optimal debt-equity ratio or an optimal
dividend payout policy? These are the questions to which this thesis
is addressed.
Several studies have already been undertaken with these questions
in mind. They have been both empirical and theoretical. The theoret-
ical work of Modigliani and Miller^^ has shown that in a world with
risk-
less debt, no growth, and no taxes, the financial managers cannot
in-
fluence the weighted average cost of capital by altering their
debt-equity
ratio. The average cost of capital in their model is
independent of
financial structure. In this thesis, the assumption of
riskless debt is
rejected in favor of a debt instrument which has associated with it
some
>)
i/Modigliani, Franco, and Merton H. Miller. "The Cost of
Capital,
Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment,"
American Economic
Review. Vol. XXVIII. June, 1958, pp. 261-297.

/•
risk for both issuer and acceptor. These risks are developed in
Chapter II. The introduction of these risks creates a model in which
there is an optimal debt-equity ratio in that there is now a debt-equity
ratio which minimizes the weighted average cost of debt and equity.
As soon as the phenomenon of growth is introduced, there is another
financial decision which may influence the value of the firm. It is the
portion of earnings paid as dividends. Two views have been advanced con-
. 3/
ceming the importance of this variable. Miller and Modigliani— have
presented a model in which the value of a finii is independent of the
dividend payout rate chosen. This may be alternately stated as showing
that the dividend payout ratio does not influence the rate at which
earnings are capitalized. Others, notably, Gordon— and Lintner,— have
expressed a quite different view - one which does involve a relation
between dividend payout ratios and the value of the firm. For reasons
developed in Chapter II, this latter view is adopted in this thesis. In
addition to hypothesizing that the dividend payout affects the capitaliza-
^^j
tion rate, a variable is introduced in an attempt to account for the effect
of the difference between the personal income tax and the capital gains tax.
I'^Miller, Merton H., and F. Modigliani, "Dividend Policy, Growth and
the Valuation of Shares," Journal of Business , Vol. XLIX, September, 1959.
I'^Gordon, Myron J., "The Investment, Financing and Valuation of the
Corporation," Homewood, Illinois: R. D. Irwin, 1962.
l^Untner. John, "Dividends, Earnings, Leverage, Stock Prices and the
Supply of Capital to Corporations," 72ie_ Review of Economics
and Statistics.
Vol. XLIV, August, 1962, pp. 2U3-269.
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With these variables we construct a model for the capitalization rate for
earnings having three terms which, taken together, imply an optimal divi-
dend policy.
Thus, our interest in the rate at which the earnings of a firm are
capitalized arises from the desire to be able to implement the theory of
capital budgeting. We are interested both in the magnitude of the
capitalization rate and the extent to which it can be influenced by
financial decisions. With these goals in mind, a model is constructed
which specifically incorporates the influences of the risks which are
thought to be associated with debt as well as the advantages and dis-
advantages of dividend payments.
Once the model is developed, statistical tests are undertaken to
assist in assessing the validity of the model as well as to provide
estimates of the values of the parameters. These estimates are then
to be used in the determination of optimal policies for debt and divi-
dends. The first of these tests is a cross sectional analysis of the
firms in five different industries in each of the fifteen years between
19U6 and 1960 inclusive. In these tests the equation specified by the
model is estimated for each industry in each of the years. These tests
show the model "fits" the data well but indicate the colinearity in
part of the data makes it impossible to split the influences of debt
and
dividends into the separate parts necessary for the determination of
optimal policies for these variables.
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That is, as originally formulated, the total influence of debt is
composed of one element which causes the capitalization rate to fall as
the debt-equity ratio is increased and one which makes it rise. At low
debt-equity ratios the first influence is thought to be the more important
while at higher debt-equity ratios, the force of the second influence pre-
dominates. This means that at some intermediate debt-equity ratio the
combination of the two forces has its minimum. As it turned out to be
statistically impossible with the chosen formulation to split the total
force into its two components, it was also impossible to determine em-
pirically optimal strategies under the assumption that both forces ex-
isted in reality. That is, the inability to partition the total force
into the hypothesized components was thought to be derived from problems
with the data (strong colinearity) and perhaps from the exact way the
equation had been specified but was not taken as necessarily implying
that the separate forces did not exist.
However, it was possible to estimate equations containing only one
term for debt and one term for dividends instead of the two hypothesized
in the initial structure. While the estimates from these latter re-
gressions are of little use in determining optimal debt and dividend
policies if the originally hypothesized influences are thought to exist,
they still are of some interest. They can be used to test whether the
capitalization rate is at all influenced by the debt-equity ratio or the
dividend payout ratio chosen by a firm. A statistically significant re-
lation between the capitalization rate and either of these variables
would imply that capitalization rates were at least not independent
of
debt or dividend policy.
'-.•>
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When these equations containing only one term each for the influence of debt
and dividends were estimated it was found that in only a minority of cases
did these two variables significantly influence the capitalization rate. It
was also found that a variable introduced to estimate the influence of the
differential between the income tax and the capital gains tax did not have
a constantly significant slope coefficient. Most of the explanatory power
of the model came from a growth variable which was originally introduced as
part of an attempt to adjust short-run expectations to long-run expectations.
It was also found that rapidly growing firms had higher capitalization rates
than slowly growing firms. According to the original hypothesis, the cap-
italization rate, defined to be the ratio of dividends per share to price per
share plus the growth rate of dividends, was independent of the magnitude of
the growth rate. It was hypothesized that higher growth rates would imply
share prices enough higher to assure that the ratio of dividends per share
to price per share plus the growth rate of dividends was the same for firms
equivalent in all other respects. These cross section regressions indicated
that as growth rates increased, prices did not increase enough to keep the
capitalization rate constant, and seemed to imply that rapidly growing firms
had higher capitalization rates - lower prices - than the original model
predicted.
Summarizing the results of both of the sets of cross section regressions,
it was found that the managerial implications which had motivated the thesis
could not be extracted from the data, that there was little influence on the
capitalization rate for any debt and dividend terms and that growth seemed the
most important variable determining capitalization rates.
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Having been unsuccessful with the estimation of the parameters of the
original model, but suspicious of the lack of results, it seemed wise to
examine the statistical properties of the model more closely. The residuals
computed from the estimated equations were the object of immediate interest.
Autccorrelated residuals, the plague of time series analysis, have their
counterpart in cross section analysis. In cross section analysis the problem
is that each firm being studied may have associated with it a particular
unexplained effect which is present each time a cross section is estimated
using that firm as a data point. This means that the error variances in
each of the cross sections have common components arising from these firm
effects. These effects when present and not specifically estimated, create,
among other things, biased slope coefficients. A tentative test showed ev-
idence of such influences associated with most of the firms which were
included in the study.
Considerable theoretical interest has been shown in the estimation of
equations containing firm effects, but due to computational difficulty,
little empirical work has been possible, A method of specifically estimating
firm effects which eliminates the biases introduced when they are ignored
has been developed by A, H, Carter.— He has shown that an adaptation of
the original hypothesis which includes the "firm effects" by introducing
dummy variables, one for each firm, will lead to unbiased estimates of
slope coefficients and error variances. The availability of these relatively
—'^Carter, A. H, , "The Estimation and Comparison of Residuals Regressions
Where There are Two or More Related Sets of Observations," Biometrika ,
Vol, 36, 1949, pp. 26-46,
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new and untried statistical techniques together with the computational ability
of the IBM 7090, and the evidence of the potential usefulness of such an
analysis in this study, lead to the adaptation of the original cross section
hypothesis and to a test which pooled the annual cross sections for an
industry into a single regression estimating the influences of debt, dividends,
and growth along with a new set of variables, the firm effects.
As there was no reason to believe that the effects of the colinearity
encountered earlier would be diminished by the introduction of firm effects,
the analysis included only one term each for debt and dividends. This meant
that although the equation had better statistical properties than the original
cross sections, it was like the second set of cross section regressions in
that it would produce few managerial implications for debt and dividend
policy. This failing of the new formulation was not considered critical
as there was more concern that the earlier cross sections had shown no
influence of debt and dividends at all, than that it had been impossible to
split these influences into two parts. Hopefully, this new approach would
imply at least some influence of debt and dividend policies on equity
prices. This hope, and the implementation of an interesting statistical
tool, created the interest in the pooled regressions.
Initially three hypotheses were to be tested. First, were there
significant firm effects and did their inclusion alter the earlier slope
coefficients; second, was growth per se still important; and, finally, could
debt and dividend policy be found to influence the rate at which earnings
were capitalized?
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Significant firm effects were found. The significance was far beyond
the ,001 level. Also, the slope coefficient for growth was reversed - it had
been positive and significant in the cross sections and it was now negative
and significant in four of the five industries examined. The positive sign
had implied that the original model had overstated the influence of growth on
equity prices. In the cross section regressions, as growth rates increased,
prices seemed not to rise as much as the model predicted. The negative sign
in the pooled regression implied just the opposite, however. In this
statistically more correct adaptation of the hypothesis, as growth rates
increased, prices increased faster than the original model had predicted.
Although the debt term still proved either to be insignificant or to have the
wrong sign, the dividend term was significant with higher dividend payout
ratios implying higher equity prices. Thus these pooled regressions had
proved most successful. They made it clear that the cross section analysis
had presented a misleading influence for growth and also restored the
dividend payout ratio to a place of importance in determining capitalization
rates.
At the time the pooled regressions were to be run, notice was taken of
another hypothesis concerning the behavior of equity prices. It had been
conjectured that the equity prices of rapidly growing firms might be reduced
by the payment of dividends while the share prices of less rapidly growing
firms would be little influenced by such an effect. Noting that both growth
rates and dividend payout rates were important in the hypothesis being tested
in this thesis, the question was raised as to whether it would be
possible to
test the validity of the conjecture. That is, if the hypothesis tested in this
't',.
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thesis showed growth and dividends to be important, could it find any
statistical verification for an interaction between the two? A rather neat
test was possible and the hypothesized interaction was found to be signif-
cant. As will be explained more fully in Chapter VI, the elasticity of
equity price with respect to changes in the growth rate is cut approximately
in half by the introduction of this interaction. In addition to being
significant in the sense that it significantly reduced residual variance,
this interaction also improved the stability of the coefficient of the
dividend payout ratio taken alone. This was taken as further evidence of
the validity of the interaction.
Thus, although no specific conclusions directly relevant to a firm's
financial policy were possible, two inferences of a managerial sort could be
made. First, the original model of the capitalization rate understated the
influence of growth on equity prices and second, there was substantiation of
a significant interaction in the way that the dividend payout and growth
rates affected the capitalization rate. The first inference means that, as
the growth rate increases, share prices rise more than enough to keep the
ratio of dividends to price plus the growth rate constant - the capitalization
rate falls as the growth rate i-ises. The second inference is that the
dividend payout rate ought not to be chosen without consideration of the
growth rate - higher growth rates should be accompanied by lower payout rates.
The major statistical or methodological conclusion was that the original
cross section analysis was inappropriate and had led to serious bias in the
estimation of slope coefficients. In addition it was concluded that the
in-
ability to estimate an influence for debt arose from the fact that
the method
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of allowing for risk was inadequate. Each industry had been hypothesized
to contain firms with identical risk associated with the streams of in-
come arising from their physical assets. While this assumption may have
been valid enough to measure the influences of growth and dividend policy
on capitalization rates, it does not seem to have been valid enough to
estimate the influences of debt. This can be seen by noting that debt
was thought to influence the capitalization rate by adding some financial
risk to the existing risk associated with the physical assets. If the
asset risk were not strictly homogeneous within the industries, differ-
ences in risk between firms would not result solely from differences in
debt-equity ratios. This mixing of different asset risk and different
financial risk would make it difficult to isolate the influence of debt
alone on financial risk. The reliability of the coefficients of the
growth and dividend terms is also diminished by this heterogeneity of
risk within industries. However, as the growth and dividend influences
do not depend so crucially on homogeneous asset risk, the slope co-
efficients are not likely to be so seriously affected as in the case of
debt. This a priori belief is reinforced by the stability of the
coefficient of the growth term and by the favorable results of the test
for the influence of an interaction of dividend policy and growth. Thus,
with respect to the assumption that the industry classification chosen
contained firms with homogeneous asset risk, it is concluded that it is
a valid enough risk characterization for the estimation of the influences
of growth and dividends but not a valid enough characterization to esti-
mate the influence of debt. To specifically deal with debt, some better
way has to be found to standardize for risks other than those arising from
the debt itself.

CHAPTER II
The Variables Influencing the Capitalizaticfo Rate
This chapter develops the variables thought to influence the
rate at which the earnings of a firm are capitalized. In order to
clarify the issues and to construct a framework for evaluating the
model once constructed, it is useful first to comment upon several
other studies concerned with the general problem of valuation.
Much of the empirical research to date on the problem of the
valuation of the firm has been primarily concerned with attempts to
explain the price at which the equity of a firm is sold. This is
usually done by arrying those variables which are thought to affect
price on the right hand side of a regression equation and proceeding
with a least squares estimate of the slope coefficients. Thus
M, J. Gordon— has models of the form:
P
r/1 w^Y^°'l br c°3 ^ W °5
-= a[(l-b)-] a^ S a,^ L
where
p
— is year end price/book value per share
W
Y
— is income/book value per share
W
b is the retention rate, (income - dividends) /in come
i^Gordon, Myron J., The Investment. Financing and Valuation of
the Corporation, Homewood, Illinois: Irwin, 196'^,
o '•'iiv:
• '.<
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r is the return on net worth
S is a size index
w is an uncertainty index
L is the debt -equity ratio
Here, s, w, and r measure the influences of the composition and
the total of the firm's assets, while b and L are concerned with the
financial mix employed to finance them.
2/
Again concentrating on price, Durand— estimates
log P = K + b log B + d log D + e log E
where P is price, B is book value (or capital per share), D is divi-
dends per share, and E is earnings per share. He also states "... a
number of others were tried in the course of the study, and these
included: total capital as a measure of size ..., several ratios of
assets to capital, a lagged variable consisting of average past divi-
dends, and some variables relating to the growth and stability of
earnings. None of these additional variables, however, significantly
reduced the residual variance..."
However, several attempts have been made along another track.
In these studies, earnings or dividends are explicitly capitalized
to obtain price. Thus Durand^'' uses a capitalization process and
1/ Durand, David, "Bank Stocks and the Analysis of Covariance,"
Econometrica (January 1955).
1^ Durand, David, "Cost of Debt and Equity Funds for Business:
Trends and Problems of Measurement," Conference on Research
in Business
Finance, pp. 215-47, New York: National Bureau or Lconomic
Research, 1952,
\C 'i>0;-,;i'(7
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also discusses several problems associated with both the amount to
be capitalized and the capitalization rate, Gordon and Shapiro-
capitalize, at a rate p, a dividend stream growing at a rate r per
year and comment that both the dividend rate and the debt-equity
ratio may affect p. Modigliani and Miller— also use a capitaliza-
tion procedure. Their model and conclusions are quite different
from those of Durand and Gordon and Shapiro, however. In "The Cost
of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment" they
explore a model in which the value of a firm is independent of the
debt-equity ratio and in "Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation
of Shares" another in which it is independent of the dividend payout
ratio and is a function only of the market discount for the risk
associated with the streams of income arising from the physical
assets the firm holds. Neither Durand nor Gordon and Shapiro present
any tests of their proposition that the capitalization rate depends
in part upon the financing decisions of the firm. Moreover, the
Modigliani and Miller assumptions rule out any such effect. Although
ii/cordon, Myron and Eli Shapiro, "Capital Equipment Analysis:
The Required Rate of Profit," Management Science , III (1956)
pp. 102-110.
l^Modigliani , Franco, and Merton Miller, "T^e Cost of Capital,
Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment," American Economic
Review (1958); and, "Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of
Shares," Journal of Business, Vol. XXXIV, No. 4.
nO .<.
lo
- 16
6/
Gordon~ is concerned with capitalizing streams, the model he develops
is one explaining price and not the capitalization rate.
The purpose of this thesis is to combine the various elements
of the regression analysis with the capitalization rate as the variable
to be explained. That is, the value of a firm will be derived as the
capitalized value of its income stream, but the capitalization factor
will be dependent upon the factors thought important in previous
studies and by the present author. A model will be developed express-
ing the manner in which these factors are thought to influence the
capitalization rate. Regression analysis will then be undertaken to
see if the hypothesized equation determining the capitalization rate
can be maintained in a statistical sense. As will be seen, this
choice of dependent variable creates several advantages over earlier
regression studies, both in interpretation and estimation.
Capitalization streams requires knowledge of two things - the
size of the streams and the capitalization rate. Since the analysis
which follows will consider the effects of risk, taxes and growth on
the value of the firm, the effects of each of these elements upon
the size of the stream and the capitalization rate must be determined.
l^Gordon, Myron J., The Investment. Financing and Valuation of
lorporation, Homewood, Illinois: Irwin, l^fJ
.
the Corpora
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First, to risk. A precise definition of what is meant by the
term risk is difficult to phrase. That the risk associated with a
situation arises from the degree of variability of its possible out-
comes seems a reasonable approximation. However, translating this
statement into an exact, measurable quantity is quite difficult.
In this thesis, two sources of uncertainty or variability will be
distinguished. Both will be called risk, but neither has an
unambiguous mathematical definition.
The first source of variability arises from the asset side of
the balance sheet and the production process it represents. The
model of this process which is adopted in this thesis is the
engineer's construct of a "black box". This conception assumes no
internal characterisitics need be known and is only interested in
the output obtained from a given input. The way input is transformed
into output - the transfer function - is the criterion used to
characterize the process. Here, the production process is thought
of as an activity - a black box - into which are placed current and
capital inputs. Out of this process come income streams with a
certain variability or predictability. This variability is what
characterizes the process. Equivalent processes - equivalent firms -
are firms which produce income streams with the same probability
distribution of outcomes in response to a unit input.
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This technique for dealing with that part of the total uncertainty
associated with a firm which arises from the production process, while
having considerable intuitive appeal is difficult to implement. Very
few actual firms produce a single output or even the same proportions
of a set of different outputs. Thus ; each firm is a combination of
"black boxes", each with possibly different characteristics. In
addition, it is almost impossible to precisely define a unit of in-
put. Even if you could find two firms with identical production
demands, various combinations of the materials required in production
are possible - e.g., excess productive capacity to meet temporary
changes in demand as opposed to higher average inventory levels and
less excess productive capacity. Each of these combinations of in-
puts may introduce different kinds and different amounts of variabil-
ity into the income streams produced. Despite these ambiguities,
the intuitive appeal of the black box construct is strong enough, so
that this conception will be used here. This source of uncertainty
will be called the "asset risk" associated with the firm.
If this were the only uncertainty introduced into the analysis -
that is - if the only uncertainty is that associated with the produc-
tion process, it can be shown that the financing mix - the debt-equity
ratio - has no influence on the value placed on the income stream
generated by the assets in which the firm invests. If, for instance,
a firm shifted its financing mix from all equity to a combination of
debt and equity, the value of the equity would have to fall from its
original amount by just the increase in debt. TTne value of the firm
-
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the total of debt and equity would be unchanged, Modigliani and
7/Millers have shown that if this were not so, arbitragers could, by
levering their own portfolios, continually make profits. The actions
of these arbitragers assures that equity prices would respond to in-
creases (or decreases) in debt in such a way as to keep the value of
a firm independent of the financial structure and entirely dependent
upon the size and uncertainty of the income streams produced by its
assets.
If we now explicitly recognize two kinds of financial risk
associated with debt, these conclusions are blunted. First, for the
arbitrager, the undoing of any gains accruing to a levered stock
involves the assumption of debt on personal account. The Modigliani
and Miller proposition requires the unlevered equity to be offered
as collateral. But the value of this equity at future points of
time is uncertainl'^ while the value of the debt obligation is certain.
Moreover, since the investor does not have limited liability as does
the corporation, this self-levering action commits the arbitrager to
a more risky position than when he held the stock levered by the
corporation. Thus, he will undertake the arbitrage operation only
as long as the value of the levered corporation is enough in excess
of that of a similar but unlevered company to compensate him
for
l^Modigliani, Franco, and Merton Miller, "The Cost of Capital,
_
Corporation Finance and the "nieory of Investment."
American Economic
Review (1958),
i/At the moment, this uncertainty, which is associated
with both
the expected eaniings and the capitalization
factor, is merely asserted.
Its origins will be discussed more fully in
the section on the role
of dividends.
r^r*-*
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undertaking the risk of self-leverage. The levered company then
sells at a premium over the unlevered one, or alternatively, the
value of the levered company has risen with the rise in its debt-
equity ratio.
It follows, therefore, that the Increment in value to a corpora-
tion arising from increasing its debt-equity ratio rises as the
physical assets in which the firm invests generate more variable
income streams. For then, the value of the pledged unlevered equity
is more variable, and thus the portfolio position of the arbitrager
becomes more risky, so the premium he demands is larger in amount.
The larger the premium, the greater the gain to the corporation
arising from corporate leverage.
Other quite different kinds of reasons may be advanced to support
the view that arbitragers would not completely undo any gains from
corporate leverage. Legal restrictions on the actions of many large
institutional investors do not allow these institutions to undertake
the self-levering arbitrage operations, placing a large burden upon
the individual arbitragers. Also, borrowing rates may not remain
at the same level for corporations and arbitragers who undertake
large positions to undo leverage gains. Higher borrowing rates for
arbitragers would make it impossible for them to assure that the
value of a firm was independent of its debt-equity ratio. Although
it might be possible to lever their personal portfolios to
match
that of any corporation, their returns would be less than
those of
the owners of the levered corporation as their interest
payments
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would be larger. Finally, margin requirements may not allow the
self levering process to take place without the committment of
collateral in addition to the shares involved in the levering process.
These infringements on the personal portfolio of the arbitrager keep
the actual market from being as perfect at the strict Modigliani and
9/Miller model requires.—
This introduction of the idea of the risk on personal account
associated with incurring debt supported by equities of uncertain
value has led to the expectation of an increase in the value of a
corporation with an increase in its debt-equity ratio. It has made
leverage on personal account more risky than leverage on corporate
account
.
In addition to this personal risk associated with debt, there
is another aspect of risk which appears to be of importance. This
time it is a risk on corporate account. If, the income stream is
composed of elements with different stability, increasing the debt-
equity ratio will cause mounting interest payments which will leave
the residual stream composed more and more of the risky elements.
In addition, a sequence of years with low earnings may not allow the
payment of interest and lead to the danger of insolvency. To prevent
l^A more extended discussion of the validity of the assumptions
made by Modigliani and Miller may be found in A. Bargess, The Effect
of Capital Structure on the Cost of Capital, Prentice-Hall, 1953.
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such an occurrence, the bondholders may impose constraints on divi-
dend policy or investment behavior. Any such limitation, as well
as the increase in the risk of the residual stream caused by the
increase in the debt-equity ratio, leads to a decline in the value
of a unit of the equity.
While the earlier risk on personal account increased the value
of the corporation more as it added more debt , this risk on corporate
account decreases the value of the corporation as the debt-equity
ratio rises. If either of these forces completely outweighed the
other - outweighed it for all debt-equity ratios - it would then be
wise to either issue no debt at all or to totally finance with debt.
For if the influence of risk on personal account dominated the
influence of risk on corporate account, then the addition of debt
would always increase the value of the corporation and would suggest
an all debt financial structure. Similarly, if the influence of risk
on corporate account completely dominated the influence of risk on
personal account, any addition of debt would decrease the value of
the corporation and would lead to an all equity financial structure.
Since we observe no firms with "all" debt, many firms with some,
and many with none, the complete dominance by either one of these
risk factors seems most unlikely. It suggests that the influence of
risk on personal account dominates for "low" debt equity ratios
causing the value of the firm to increase as debt is first added,
while the effect of risk on corporate account predominates at "high
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debt-equity ratios causing the value cf the firm to decrease as debt
is continually added. Tr.us we hypothesize tr.at tr.e value cf a stream
of earnings generated by assets financed with a -ixture of debt and
equity rises as debt is increase! frc- zerc, hut falls as "toe much"
debt is added tc the capital strjcfjre.
Two sorts cf ris<s have been disting-jished - asset rLsV. and
financial ris:<. Asset risk influences value by making fires with
more variable outputs per unit cf input - firms having production
processes generating outputs with greater dispersion - have lower
equity prices than firms with less variable outputs, Financial
risk has a more complicated effect, Tr.e t-c risk characteristics
of debt cause the value cf the firr. to rise as debt is initially
added but lead tc a fall in the value of the fire as continual
amounts cf debt are added.
Next, tc the effects of growth on the capitalization rate. Here
there are several issues. First, is it earnings or dividends that
get capitalized and second, dc dividends "count" - that is, is the
capitalization rate affected by the dividend payout rate?
In a world without taxes and -ith no uncertainty associated with
the production process, there is a neat, well-defined answer to both
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questions. As has been shown by Lintneri2.'^ or Miller and ModiglianiiL^
,
capitalizing earnings available to stockholders, or dividends paid to
stockholders is equivalent. There is some dispute still, but it revolves
around the issue of whether dividends are valued in and of themselves or
because they are formally equal to the earnings which are being capital-
ized. Furthermore, Miller and Modigliani in "Dividend Policy, Growth,
and the Valuation of Shares" have shown that with a given investment
policy, the dividend payout has no influence on the valuation of the
earnings. When there is no uncertainty associated with the outcome of
the production process, any dividend now with investment given implies
a smaller ownership in the capital gains accruing to the firm - smaller
in value by just the value of the dividend.
Introducing uncertainty about the outcome of the production process
12/
dispells the simplicity (and certainty) of the above results.— It is
still true that long-run dividends and long-run earnings available to the
shareholders are equivalent, so there seems little problem over what gets
capitalized. The exact role of dividends is now more complicated, however.
—
'^Lintner, John , "Dividends , Earnings, Leverage, Stock Prices and
the Supply of Capital to Corporations," '^^_^^^^_^^'^ °^ Economics and
Statistics , Vol, XLIV, August, 1962, pp. 243-259.
i-VModigliani , Franco, and Merton Miller, "Dividend Policy, Growth,
and the Valuation of Shares," Journal of Business , Vol. XXXIV, No. U,
ii^Lintner, John, "Dividends, Earnings, leverage. Stock Prices and
the Supply of Capital to Corporations," The Review of Economics and
Statistics, Vol, XLIV, August, 1962, pp. 2U3-269, contains an eiafiorate
analysis of the effects of various types of uncertainty in a Modigliani
and Miller context. This piece should make it clear that there is
as
much uncertainty about how uncertainty ought to be introduced
as there
is about its implications.
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Because of the prevalence of behavior rules for the payment of dividends
which relate dividends to smoothed past or to expected future profits,
a change in dividends often indicates a revision of earnings expecta-
tions on the part of the managers of the firm.—' The knowledge of
such rules leads to the movements of share prices with changes in dividend
rates. From the point of view of this thesis such movements reflect
changes in expectations about future earnings and do not affect the
process by which earnings are capitalized. Thus, one must show care
on the issue of what gets capitalized to distinguish between the
information in dividend behavior and the value associated with the actual
dividend.
Although uncertainty doesn't affect the amount that should be cap-
italized, it does seem to alter the influence of the dividend payout
rate on the capitalization rate. Presumably, the purpose of investing
in securities is to allocate resources over the lifetime of the saver -
to enable him to achieve a desired consumption pattern. This being the
case, the value of the original investment as well as the returns from
the investing are meant to be claimed at some date.-— If the behavior
—
^An example of this type of behavior can be found in John Lintner,
"Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends, Retained
Earnings and Taxes," American Economic Review , XLVI, May, 1956, pp. 97-
113, where he proposes a dividend rule of the following sort:
AD = c(rP^-D^_^)
Here, the change in dividends is a fraction, c, of the discrepancy be-
tween desired dividends, rP. , and the actual dividends last period,
D ^, This equation implies that dividends are
a weighted average of
past profits,
—
^Modigliani, F, , and R, Brumberg, "Utility Analysis and the
Consumption Function: An Interpretation of Cross Section _ Data,
in
Post Keynesian Economics , K, Kurihara, Editor, Rutgers
University Press.
195U, ""
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of the stock prices is somewhat unpredictable - as in the fashion of
a random walk around a more or less predictable trend,— - the actual
price at which securities may be sold at any specific time is unknown.
This uncertainty about prices introduces some risk into the realization
of capital gains. The ability to purchase many different securities -
to construct a portfolio - would lessen this risk of having to sell
any particular security at a temporarily low price as it would create
more freedom of choice as to the security to sell at any particular
time. To the extent that security prices tend to move together in the
short i^ur), however, the usefulness of a portfolio in creating predict-
able capital gains income without capital losses is diminished. In
addition, if relatively small or steady amounts of income are desired,
the transaction costs involved in the selling of securities may well
lead the investor to prefer some dividends. This risk associated with
the realization of capital gains along with the inconvenience and charges
required to complete the transaction, may well lead the investor to
prefer a share paying out some of its earnings as dividends to one which
allows the investor to realize his income only in the form of capital
gains. This implies that the capitalization rate depends, in part at
least, on the amount of earnings paid as dividends.
—
^Evidence for the validity of this conception of the movements of
security prices can be found in S. S, Alexander, "Price Movements in
Speculative Markets: Trends or Random Walks," Industrial Management
Review, School of Industrial Management, M.I.T., Vol. 2, No. Z , May 1961,
pp 7-2 6; or, P. S, Cootner, "Stock Prices: Random
vs. Systematic
Changes," Industrial Management Review , School of Industrial
Management,
M.I.T,. Vol, i. No, 2, Spring, lyb2, pp, 2U-U5.
'.u-ff>
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The next element to be considered is taxes. Three types of
influences, at least, ought to be distinguished. The fact that interest
payments may be deducted as business expense when calculating income for
tax purposes while dividend payments may not be deducted, clearly ought
to shift financing preferences toward debt. In fact, in the context of
the Modigliani and Miller models of "The Cost of Capital, Corporation
Finance and the Theory of Investment" tnis deductibility causes the
addition of debt to constantly increase the value of the firm. They
resolve this dilemma by introducing a ceiling to the debt-equity ratio -
a "maximum allowable leverage". Within the framework of the model being
constructed here, however, the influence of a ceiling to the allowable
amount of debt is not abrupt but gradual and continuous. At first debt
is thought to increase the value of the firm and then to decrease it as
the residual income becomes more risky. Taxes, through the deductibility
of interest, decrease the former disadvantages of debt relative to equity
by creating a larger after tax income stream. This shifts the balance
of forces towards allowing more debt than in the no-tax situation, but
the risk on corporate account still keeps continuous additions of debt
from increasing the value of the firm.
In addition to this differential deductibility and its effects on
the decision between debt and equity, the differential taxation of
personal income and capital gains influences the choice within equity
between new issues and retentions as a source of funds.
The value of earnings claimed through capital gains is taxed
at
rates, at most half as large as those applicable to dividends
and no
higher than 25%. This makes capital gains desired as
against dividends.
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and works in an opposite direction to the preference for dividends as
against capital gains derived from the uncertainty associated with
stock prices and the costs associated with selling shares.
Another aspect of this capitalization problem can be understood
if one considers the decision of whether to finance an investr.er.t fror.
new issues or from retentions. If profits are retained, the stock-
holder has the income taxed only at capital gain rates while if some
of the profits are paid as dividends and then new shares are issued to
the old shareholder to enable him to retain his share of the firm, he
loses the personal income tax on the dividend and still pays the gains
tax on the future earnings. Thus financing with retentions is made
less expensive - more valuable to the shareholders - than financing
with new issues.
Thusfar, we have discussed the influence of financial structure
on the capitalization rate. It is now necessary to examine the factors
affecting this rate which arises from the mix of physical assets in which
the firm invests. These factors are thought to exert their influence by
affecting the probability distribution of the revenue stream arising
from a unit input to the production process. Assuming investors to be
risk averters, more risky streams of income sell for lower prices than
less risky streams with the same expected value. If it were possible to
characterize the riskiness of the income streams associated with the
assets of a particular firm it might then be possible to estimate the
effect of this risk on the capitalization rate. That is, if the transfer
function which characterizes the production process could be exactly
defined.
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allowance for the risk of each firm would be possible. Most previous
attempts at such characterization have not been very successful.
Gordon_«/ tried variance of earnings and annual percentage changes in
sales as measures of risk in his estimating but found either they had
insignificant slope coefficients or incorrect signs. Some rather
extensive analysis has been performed on the same data which will be
used in this thesis in another study conducted by Cootner and Holland
17/ . .
at M.I.T.l—' They attempted to ascertain what variables were proxies
for risk by correlating them with rates of return. Their hypothesis was
that higher than average rates of return could be justified only by higher
than average risk. The difficulty with the hypothesis is that it is
difficult to decide among alternatives which is a better measure of
risk. Certainly, there is more to variations in rates of return than
variations in risk, so the maximum expected correlation is less than
unity, but how large must it be before one is convinced that any "risk"
variable truly measures the risk associated with that particular firm?
An alternate approach is suggested in the writings of Modigliani
and Millerii''. They imagine all firms to have risk characteristics
such that they may be grouped into classes within which each firm has
identical risk. Apart from saying that it depends on the probability
distribution of the income stream, no attempt is made to define exactly
ii^Gordon, Myron J.. The Investment . Financing and Valuation of
the
Corporation , Homewood, Illinois: Irwin, 1962,
i^/Risk and Rate of Return: A Study by Paul H. Cootner and
Daniel M. Holland, Sponsored by the American
Telephone and Telegraph
company, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
DSR Project No. 9565,
March, 1963,
i£/Modigliani, Franco, and Merton Miller, "The Costof
Capital,
Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment."
American Economic
Review (1958),
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what risk is, only that it is the same for all firms in that class. Their
empirical tests implicitly assume that the "industry" is a definition
suitably close to a risk class.
Because of the difficulties encountered by Cootner and Holland in
defining risk variables and those reported by Gordon when he unsuccess-
fully used variance of earnings and percentage changes in sales as
risk variables, no attempt will be made to associate risk with any
specific continuous variable associated with each firm. Instead, an
industry classification will be thought to contain firms with largely
identical risk characteristics. That is, the risk class concept of
Modigliani and Miller with industry groups as risk classes, will be the
technique employed to account for asset risk. Thus, all firms within
an industry classification will be assumed to have the same transfer
function and thus the same asset risk adjustment to their capitalization
19/
rate and this adjustment will be different for each industry.—
All the elements which will be included in the analysis as used by
others have been discussed. The manner in which they are thought to
exercise their influence will now be devloped.
ii^Durand, David, "Bank Stocks and the Analysis of Covariance,"
Econometrica (January 1955). seems to employ this technique, as no attempt
was made to split the effects of financing on risk from the effects arising
from the assets in which the firm invests. As data in his study
were
drawn only on banks, it appears to have been assumed that the
risks
associated with the assets of each bank were not very different.
Because
he had but one risk class, it is difficult to use the
results of his
study to test the usefulness of this technique as a
method of standard-
izing for risk.

CHAPTER III
The Statistical Specification of the Model
Thusfar we have presented the variables thought to influence
the capitalization rate and the types of forces they are thought to
exert. After deriving the influence of the capitalization rate on
equity prices, this chapter develops the statistical specification
of the manner in which debt and dividends are thought to influence
this capitalization rate. The results of the tests of this
specification are presented in the next two chapters.
The analysis begins by considering the case where no uncertainty
is associated with the income streams produced by the assets and
there are no taxes. In such a case, there is no need for two
financial assets - no need for both debt and equity - and no financial
risks need be considered. To see how the capitalization rate in-
fluences equity prices it is necessary to consider a firm earning
amount Y which continually reinvests a portion k of these earnings
o
into assets which yield a rate of return of r. The increment in
earnings from such an investment is rKY^^. Thus
^°= rkYo or Y = Yo e^*'*
dt
Earnings grow at a rate kr per period. Reinvesting a portion k of
earnings implies that the portion (1-k) is paid as dividends. T^us
at each point in time dividends are (1-k) Y„ e^^^ If the discount
for the futurity of these dividend payments is at a rate p^, the
.--f.'
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present value of the stream of dividends is
V = /- (1-k) Y, ^-^^o-^^^t ^^
o
_
(1-k) Yo ^ DIV^,
P^ - kr Po-kr
Alternately, if one wishes to develop the relation between
the capitalization rate and equity prices from the point of view
of earnings instead of dividends, it is only necessary to note
that the return to the owners is a perpetual stream of magnitude
Yq
,
plus the streams of future earnings arising from the constant
reinvestment of a fraction k of earnings. The value of the earn-
ings generaged by the present assets is
V = r Y, e ° = II
In addition, each time an amount kY(t) is reinvested, it
contributes an increment to the value of the firm which, at that
time, has a value
-Pof
AV(t) = /" rkY(t) e dx - kY(t)
= kY(t) ll::^
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The present value of this future increment in earnings is
-Pot
kY(t) (r-po) e
The present value of all such future increments is
"^ot
/^ kY(t) (r-p,) e dt
/- kY «'^^ ^^^ e"'°' dt
kY^ ( r-poJ_
p"(p
-kr)
° o
Thus the total present value of the firm is
Yq kY„ (r-po)
V = ;- + Po (Po-kr)
-
(1-k) Yq
Po-1^^
which is identical with the value obtained from capitalizing the
dividend stream.

- 3t -
If the rate of growth of earnings and of dividends, kr, is
called g, this may be written
DIV
Letting DIV become dividends per share and P be the price per
share of the equity, this may be rewritten as
DIV
The total yield, dividend plus capital gain must be a constant
Pq, the discount for futurity. Higher growth rates, dividends per
share unchanged, imply higher prices,—
Introducing uncertainty into the income stream generated by the
assets brings two changes. The discounting of future revenues to
determine present values has complete justification only in the case
of certainty. However, most attempts at incorporating uncertainty
do assume that correct results are obtained by treating the discount
rate as a composite of both time discount and risk discount. The
value of an uncertain future stream is then computed by discounting
the expected value of the stream at each point in time by this double-
purpose discount rate. This approach to valuation under uncertainty
is adopted here. Thus, the first change in the certainty model
arising from the consideration of uncertain income streams is that
Po is now the discount for futurity and risk.
y-This result may be found in Myron Gordon and Eli Shapiro,
"Capital Equipment Analysis: The Required Rate of Profit,"
Management
Science, III (1956), pp. 102-110; and. Franco Modigliani and
Merton Miller. "Dividend Policy Growth, and the Valuation
of Shares,
Journal of Business, Vol. XXXIV, No. 4.
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The consideration of uncertain income streams also introduces
the financial problems which are the concern of this thesis. It is
now useful to distinguish between a security promising relatively
sure income streams - prior claims - called debt and a security re-
presenting residual claims - equity. In Chapter II, two influences
of debt were noted, one which would lead to an increase in the value
of the firm and one which led to a decrease as the debt-equity ratio
was increased. These forces are thought to influence the value of
the firm by affecting the capitalization rate - by causing it to
differ as different debt-equity ratios are used.
To allow the influence of increasing the debt-equity ratio to
be first in one direction and then in another, a quadratic effect is
specified for debt. That is, the debt adjusted capitalization rate
is thought of as
a(b-f)2
P = Po e
where — is the debt-equity ratio.
E
This functional form for the effects of debt allows the addition
of debt first to decrease the effective value of p and then to increase
it as -begins to exceed b. Figure 1 shows the behavior of
Po ^
a(b-^)
D
while a determines its steepness. The specification allows debt
first
as function of p The coefficient b locates the bottom of the curve,
to increase the value of the equity and then to decrease it.
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As discussed in Chapter II, uncertain share prices and costs of
realizing capital gains are thought to make dividends raise equity
prices as the dividend payout ratio rises from zero but forgone
capital gains make equity prices fall as too large a portion of earn-
ings are paid as dividends. Thus the influence of the dividend pay-
out ratio is two sided - depending upon its magnitude, just as was
the influence of debt. To account for this effect of the dividend
payout ratio, the capitalization rate is adjusted as follows
P = Po e
,
,
DIV ,2
DIV . .
where ^— is the dividend payout ratio used by the firm. Dividends
PROF
raise equity value until r^ru equals d and decrease it for further
increases in the payout rate.
The influence of the differential gains and income tax on the
relative value of earnings financed by retentions and new issues will
be handled by supposing that earnings financed by retentions are
capitalized at a lower rate - have higher value - than earnings
financed by new issues. That is, retained earnings, because they are
not subject to the personal tax, can purchase more assets than earn-
ings paid out as dividends, taxed at the personal level and reobtained
through new issues, "nie differential effect will be approximated by
treating the capitalization rate for retentions as a fraction, f, of
the capitalization rate for new issues. The capitalization rate
for
the total will be taken as the geometric average of these two
elements.
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Thus, if Pjj is the rate at which earnings from new issues are
capitalized, fp^, is the capitalization rate for retentions and
_ r.
R = Retentions
r NI ,^ ,R-R+Ni ^"RTHT
P = LP- (fp ) J = p„ f NI = New issues
is the weighted capitalization rate. If f is unity, retentions are
no more valuable to the stockholders than new issues and p is un-
affected by the portion of equity that is composed of retentions.
To the extent that f is less than unity, increasing R as a portion
2/
of R+NI lowers the weighted average,—.
Thus, the influences of uncertainty, debt, dividends and taxes
have been specified and the final specification of the financial
influences on the capitalization rate becomes
.
.
D,2 ,. DIV 7^ R[a(b--) + c(d-^j,) ] j:^
P = Po e f
However, two sources of uncertainty were introduced at the outset of
Chapter II. Equation 1 shows how allowance has been made for the
financial risks. To account for the uncertainty arising from the
assets in which the firm invests, it was decided to use the risk
class concept with industries as risk classes. To account for the
1/substantially the same result would be achieved if an
arithmetic averaging were used. The result would be
Poi:i - (1-f) rTnT^
Each of these specifications causes p to decrease with j^. As the
geometrically weighted average performs better at the Z;;^^^™"
and is closer in spirit to the specifications chosen
for the other
variables, it was chosen over the arithmetic average.
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variability in risk between classes, p^ will be considered the average
market rate of capitalization and will be adjusted in an exponential
way to account for the particular risk associated with any risk class.
Thus, for the k risk class, the capitalization rate adjusted for
asset risk will be thought of as (p^) with r, adjusting the average
rate, Pq, to the special characteristics of the k class.
Two types of reasons for inter-firm differences in capitalization
rates have been discussed - asset differences and financial differ-
ences. In addition, there is reason to believe that capitalization
rates differ over time. That is, the average market capitalization
rate changes through time reflecting changes in the level of interest
rates and yields of securities of all varieties. It is a macro-
economic variable beyond the control of any firm. Thus, the capi-
talization rate during any period depends upon the assets in which
the firm invests, the debt and dividend policy it pursues, and the
average market capitalization rate for that time period.
The following type of market process emerges as the mechanism
determining the capitalization rate for each firm. In each period,
an average market rate of capitalization, p^ is determined by
matching the demand and supply of all investors and savers acting
together. To any firm in the k'^^ class, the capitalization rate.
unadjusted for debt and dividends is (pj *". For that period, for
each firm in the k"^^ class, the appropriate capitalization rate is
D 2 ,. .Six ,2 R
r
(1) (Pj ^ e
[a(b-'g-)^ + c(d-"^F) ]
-R+NI
o

- uo
For estimating purposes, it will be written
D9 DIV 2^ R
DIV r, [a(b--) + c(d-rrT-p) ] .---«.
(-:r+ g) = (Pj '^ e ^ ^^^^ f^^^ e^
TTiis is equivalent to
DJV,
g
,DIV
,
e P e(—
— + g) = p e or —'""^ = e
P P
The market process envisioned attempts to determine a price such
that the ratio is unity; thus e^ measure the divergence from this
value
.
Taking logarithms, the expression becomes
DIV D 9 DIV 2 R
(2) log(— +g) = T^ log p^ + 3(^-E^ + ^^"^-PROF^ * rTnT log f + e
Before explaining the tests which were performed to test the
validity of this model, it is useful at this time to assess this
model in terms of those mentioned earlier, both to compare its
managerial implications and to contrast its statistical formulation.
As stated in Chapter I, interest in this capitalization rate
arose from an interest in capital budgeting and the need for a re-
quired or cut-off rate of return. Projects earning more than this
required rate increase the value of the firm, projects earning less
decrease the value of the firm. This required rate of return is also
called the cost of capital as it is the return which must be earned
before increments in value are possible. When both debt and equity
are used to finance investments, the cost of capital is the
weighted
average of the costs - the required return - of the amounts
of debt
and equity used.
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For debt the required return is the interest rate, r, while for
equity the required rate of return is the capitalization rate, p.
The average of these costs is
rD + pE
c/c = ^
D + E
The literary exposition in Chapter II and the specification in
equation (2) present a model in which there is a dividend policy
which minimizes the value of p with respect to the dividend payout
ratio as well as a debt-equity ratio which minimizes the cost of
3/
capital with respect to the debt-equity ratio.— Thus, there are
implicit two optimal financial policies. It is therefore in con-
flict with the work of Modigliani and Miller in both "The Cost of
Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment" and
"Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares," and these
differences arise almost entirely from the choice of assumptions
with respect to the riskiness of debt and the influence of uncertainty
on the value of dividend payments ,11'' The models of Gordon also imply
an optimal debt and dividend policy while that of Durand does not
include debt and forces dividends to influence share prices in a
monotonic way precluding any optimal policy different from distributing
either no part or all of the profits.
i^-nie exact implications are discussed more fully in Chapter
VI.
i/Modigliani, Franco, and Merton Miller, ""me Cost of Capital,
Vol, XXXIV, No. 4,
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Concerning the statistical differences, the major one is the
choice of a dependent variable. From the point of view of estimation,
it is important to correctly specify the variable which is influenced
by the risks associated with debt and the advantages and disadvantages
of dividends. The view taken in this thesis is that it is not the
share price that is directly affected by debt and dividend policy but
that the reactions to these financial choices is on the rate at which
earnings are capitalized. Debt and dividend policy are thought to
affect the value of the firm by changing the capitalization rate and
thus the capitalization rate is the variable to be explained - the
statistically correct dependent variable.
One of the difficulties with the Gordon analysis was that cross
sections run in different years produced different slope coefficients
in each of these years. The variation in these slope coefficients
was due to changing circumstances regarding the valuation of each
of the independent variables, but was also due to the fact that
market rates of interest and equity yields in general were changing
from period to period. The formulation presented here with its use
of a market determined rate appropriate to each year allows the separa-
tion of these two effects and therefore promises a more careful in-
terpretation of the results.
Another advantage of the specification presented here is that it
allows certain of the explanatory variables to influence the
capital-
ization rate first in one direction and then in another.
TTie debt-
equity ratio and the dividend payout rate are specified
to increase
the value of the fim as the variables are increased from zero and
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then decrease the value as they are continually increased. None of
the other statistical studies have been formulated in this manner.
In addition, there is little reason to believe that the error terms
are heteroschedastic; i.e., that firms with high equity prices per
share will have correspondingly high errors of estimation, as is the
problem with some of the models explaining price. In these models,
there is concern that the magnitude of the errors depends upon the
magnitude of the dependent variable. To avoid these difficulties
some sort of deflating is necessary.— In the model presented here,
however, the dependent variable is already normalized, it is a rate
of return and the independent variables are either ratios or growth
rates. Thus, there seems little reason to believe that the errors
are heteroschedastic.
While the concepts of a risk class and an average market
capitalization rate at each point of time aid in analysis of sets
of cross section data, they are not an unmixed blessing. Commenting
on the risk class concept as a classification scheme for asset risk,
Durandl^ has remarked ,.. "To the practically minded, it is unthinkable
to postulate the existence of two or more distinct corporations with
income streams that can fluctuate at random and yet be perfectly
correlated from now until doomsday..." Yet to believe that such a
l/cordon, Myron J,, The Investment. Financing and Valuation of
the Corporation , Homewood"! Irwin, lyb'^. Gordon comments on tnis
difficulty in connection with one of his earlier studies, and later
deflates prices by book values,
l^Durand, David, "The Cost of Capital in an Imperfect Market:
A Reply to Modigliani and Miller," American Econ omic Review
(September,
1 nan \1959),

- 1+4 -
classification can be a useful theoretical device is even less
difficult than to expect to be able to define some empirically use-
ful catagorization in reality. As may become clearer, this dis-
advantage may well be the most serious difficulty with the model as
formulated here,
A second kind of drawback is that , although the effect of the
— and the rr-r are not linear, they are both quadratic and thus
E PROF * ^ ^
symmetric. If, in fact, the response to increments in debt is small
until a certain debt-equity ratio is reached and then becomes very
pronounced, any symmetric specification will not fit very well.
The hypothesis is that three types of variables influence
capitalization rates; asset risks, financial variables and time.
The kinds of tests to determine if the specified relations are correct
seem to be of two types. The first is a set of cross section esti-
mates of the coefficients a, b, c, d and f in equation (2) for each
risk class in each of several years. These should be inspected for
goodness of fit, stability across time, and consistency with related
estimates. In each of these regressions the term r^^ log p^ would be
estimated as the constant, allowing no estimate of rj^. If each of
the regressions could be pooled together into a single regression,
and a time series for Po introduced, it would be possible to estimate
In addition, it would be useful if some tests could be performed
to ascertain the degree of heterogeneity of risk between classes
as
well as possible nonlinearity in the relation between
dividend
payout and growth.
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To test these hypotheses, data on several risk classes are
required with enough firms in each class to allow cross section
regressions to be estimated. The more firms in a class the better
the statistical significance in the cross sections, but also the
greater doubt as to the homogeneity of the asset risks of each of
the firms. As the design of the tests required comparison of cross
section estimates in several years, a long time series on each firm
was desired, as more years of data would lead to more cross sections
to compare. Finally, for all the firms to be analysed it was nec-
essary to have both balance sheet and income statement data. At the
outset of the thesis, the available data which best satisfied all
these requirements was some prepared by the Studley-Shupert advisory
service. The Studley-Shupert data were punched-card balance sheet
and income statement data on approximately 400 firms in UO industries.
Five of these industries included a number of firms in excess of 15.
These were Building Materials, Chemicals, Drugs, Machinery-Industrial,
and Oils, These five industries were chosen as risk classes to test
the financial influences hypothesized in the thesis.
The development of the theory, although considering growth, was
not entirely dynamic - that is, all the variables were treated as
^ . ,D DIV R .
though they were not changing through time t—, -^y* g» r+ni^
growing at a steady rate (Y, DIV, V, P). It was the steady state or
target - ratio and the long-run ^^ ratio as well as
the long-run
rate of growth which were the variables of the system.
With this in
mind, the data to enter the regression had to be the best
estimates
available of these target variables. To this end. the
annual data
were smoothed in the following fashion.
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For the dividend which was being capitalized, a simple average
of this year's and the next two years' was taken. This implies that
on-the-average the market is able to estimate with no error the
magnitude of the dividend, and that it concerns itself with these
three years' information. This expectation assumption was made
about several of the variables and deserves some comment.
The alternative ways available to deal with the problem of
expectations were to build a model explicitly concerned with the
transformation of current and past data into expectations on future
data, or to assume that, however expectations were formed, they were
on-the-average correct. This latter assumption allows the actual
data occurring to be used in cases which require expectational data
to be employed. It was decided that since the emphasis in the thesis
was confined to the manner in which this expectational data would be
used in a model predicting price and not on their formation , this
simplifying assumption that expectations are formed by a process with
7/
zero average error would be made.—
Because of the prevalence of dividend rules relating dividend
payments to smoothed profits, and the need for an estimate of the
long-run payout ratio used by each firm, the sum of dividends in this
l^In "Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements,"
Econometrica, Vol, 29, No, 3, July 1961, J. F. Muth advanced the
same idea when he hypothesized that "...expectations of firms (or,
more generally, the subjective probability distribution of outcomes)
tend to be distributed, for the same information set, about
the
_
prediction of the theory (or the objective probability distribution
of outcomes)."
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and the next two years was divided by the sum of profits in each of
these years. An alternate method of smoothing would have been to
average the dividend profit ratios in each of these years but this
places more weight on a single low profit - high payout ratio year
8/than does the method chosen,—
The same smoothing technique was used to estimate the long-run
debt-equity ratio. It should be noted here that debt was defined
as bonds maturing in more than one year plus preferred stock while
equity was capital stock and capital surplus retentions at book value,
Each was defined in an attempt to partition the claims into fixed
and residual.
Some care must be shown when estimating the rate of growth of
dividends. Assuming again a dividend rule which relates dividends
to smoothed past or expected profits, and short term variations in
p/
— Suppose
DIV(l)
-
DIV(2)
= 3 DIV(3) = Ka, K>1 because PROFO) is
PROF(l) PR0F(2) * PROFO)
abnormally low. The method chosen to derive the long-run payout re-
sults in
,
PROFO) ^
a[l + (k+1) j-pj^oF ^
The alternative method yields a(l - (k-l)i). With PROFO) abnormally
low relative to PROF(l) and PR0F(2), the chosen method yields an
estimate closer to a. For K<1, the alternate method is better,
but
the most cause of variation in K would seem to arise from
low profits,
and as they appear in the denominator of the ratio, would
result in K>1.
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the rate of growth of profits, the rate of growth of dividends will
be a weighted average of past rates of growth of profits. Thus, when
the object is to estimate the long-run rate of growth of dividends
apart from the influence of the response coefficient, the rate of
9/growth of profits is an unbiased estimator.—
Two techniques were adopted to estimate this growth rate. A
five year growth rate generated from the earnings for the current
year and the two years on either side of it was computed as that
exponential rate of growth which fits the five periods best in a
least squares sense. A fifteen year growth rate of earnings, from
1946 to 1960, was also computed according to the same procedure.
The divergence of the set of short term rates for any specific
firm from its long term rate led to an alteration of the original
hypothesis to incorporate the possible transient effects of short-
term variations in the rate of growth of earnings. That is, if the
growth rate of dividends used in the capitalization procedure was
taken to be the short-term growth, g , and if this deviated from the
long-term rate of growth, gj., for that firm, it was expected that
the market would discount the difference. When the short term rate
—
^If earnings have been growing at a steady rate for a long time,
but at time t^ undergo an alteration in rate of growth to g' , a
Lintner-type dividend policy results in a rate of growth of dividends
which is
^ _
^-(g+c)(t-to)
''
^1
. g' e-(g^^)(^-^°)^
This approaches g' at a rate which depends upon g' itself and upon
c, the response coefficient in the dividend rule.
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of growth was in excess of the long, the price was expected not to
be as high as the model would predict. Thus, — + g would exceed
P s
that which would have been predicted had the short and long-term
rates of growth been equal. This led to the presumption that when
growth was defined as short-term growth, the difference between the
long and short-term growth rates should enter as an independent
variable with a sign predicted to be negative.
A similar expectation was held when the long-term growth estimate
was used as the rate at which dividends were expected to grow. Here,
though, when short-term growth was in excess of long-term growth the
expectation was that the price would be higher than predicted and
DIV
thus —— + g would fall short of predicted and require a positive
sign on the difference between the long and short rates of growth.
If in an attempt to allow for this influence, only the difference
between the short and long-term rates of growth were used it would
force their slope coefficients to be identical. To avoid this, the
long-term rate of growth was added as an additional independent variable.
The final specification becomes
log (^ +g) = r^ log Po + hCg^-gg) + h'g^ + 3(^-f)^ * =^^-S^^
+ ^ log f + E
R+NI
Two types of difficulties with this model should be noted.
First, there may be some simultaneity inherent in the debt-equity
variable. That is, firms with less asset risk may face supply
schedules for debt which differ from those for firms with more asset
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risk. High debt equity ratios may not indicate financially risky
firms, but rather firms with such low asset risk that they are
allowed at low cost to finance themselves with large amounts of debt.
Also, it has been postulated— that dividend payments made by
firms with very profitable potential investments would penalize their
share price more than payments made by firms without such profitable
opportunities. To the extent that high rates of growth are associated
with high profitability, one would then expect the slope coefficient
on the dividend payout ratio would be different as growth was
different.
This concludes the specification of the model and the definition
of the variables. The next chapter presents the results of the tests
which were performed to test the validity of these specifications.
12. This conjecture was made by Professor E. Kuh.

CHAPTER IV
The Cross Section Regressions
This chapter presents the results of the cross section
estimation. Four regressions were run on both of the dependent
variables. The independent variables in each regression were chosen
to test the various possible combinations of effects possible with
D DIV
the — and ' variables. In each regression the lone- term rate of
E PROF ^
growth and the difference between the long and short-term rates of
D
growth was included. The first regression had — and its square in
DIV
addition to these, and the second had— and its square, the third
PROF
had both — and —— and their squares, while the fourth had tt and
E PROF E
21^ , In each of these — was added as an explanatory variable at
PROF R+NI
the last step.
Three things became apparent immediately. Most of the explanation
of the dependent variable had its origin in the growth variables; the
D . V DIV _,
high intercorrelation between — and its square and between "-—- and
E r KOf
its square made it impossible to separate the effect of these variables
R
into the two parts hypothesized; and the coefficient of pTJJj" "^s for
the most part never as great as its standard error, and when it was,
it was as often positive as negative.—
i^As this coefficient is log f, and f is less than unity, it
should be negative.
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In an attempt to ascertain the significance of any given slope
coefficient, it was decided to accept significance if the coefficient
was as large as its standard error. Since the null hypothesis is
that the coefficient differs from zero, a one-tail test is appropriate,
One standard error leaves approximately a 20% chance of accepting the
hypothesis when it should be rejected when there are 15 degrees of
freedom, and an 18% chance with 20 degrees of freedom. This is the
range of the degrees of freedom resulting from most of the cross
section estimates.
Using this rule, the significance of the coefficient of „j
is shown in Table 1, It can be seen that no consistent influence
p
can be attached to ^ i .. . This poor result was feared as the data
were being gathered. Since the original S-S data did not allocate
equity into the two components, R and NI, reference was made to
Moody's Manual and the annual balance sheets. The ratio was treated
as a constant for each firm over the whole period, so it was estimat-
ed as that ratio occurring in the middle of the period, that on
December 31, 1952, While compiling the raw data, it could be seen
that reference was frequently made to notes to the financial state-
ments explaining that an amount had been transferred from retentions
to capital stock due to the issuance of a stock dividend, or that
other accounting practices had led to transfers between the accounts.
These indicated that although the total equity might be consistently
estimated, its allocation between new issues and retentions varied
from firm to firm largely due to differing accounting
practices. As
the purpose is to treat the parts of equity as they are
differently
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TABLE 1
Frequency of Significance of Coefficient of R/R+NI
.DIVABC
INDUSTRY NS S- S+ NS S- S+ NS S- S+
Bldg. Mat. 8 3 7 4 7 U
Chemicals 8 3 7 13 8 3
Drugs 10 1 11 11
Mach.-Ind. 6 5 7 13 6 5
Oils 3 8 632 911
f- u...
. .iroy
•,!. I'J
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affected by the personal income tax, what is needed is an internal-
external division of the equity account. It was hoped that these
accounting differences would not so distort the comparability of the
financial accounts so as to render them useless for a test of the
hypothesis at hand. The lack of any consistent influence for this
variable seems to indicate that this hope was in vain. That is, the
inability to find an influence for the differential treatment of
income and capital gains is taken as implying that the data were as
poor as feared and is not taken as conclusive evidence that the tax
effect was non-existent. Because of these difficulties with the
data, all future comments on the results of regressions concern
p
equations in which the term ——— is not included,
^ R+NI
Table 2 shows the high intercorrelation between the level and
the squares of both the ^ and ^^ variables. It is uniformly quite
high and makes attempts to split the influence of either of these
variables into two parts very difficult. Some of this correlation
could be expected on a priori grounds. The expected value of the
correlation coefficient between values drawn from a rectangular
distribution and their squares is
^f or .9375.
If the distribution
is triangular upward. Figure 2, or triangular downward. Figure 3,
the correlation is .960 or .956 respectively. Thus although the
specific distributions of the independent variable is not known, if
they have shapes at all like the three mentioned, the correlation has
a high expected value. That such high correlation may lead to
unstable
.•; :s
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TABLE 2
Correlation of Level and Square of the Debt-Equity Ratio
and the Dividend Payout Proportion
DEBT/EQUITY DIVIIEND/PROFIT

aa
Q
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slope coefficients can be seen from the following example.
2/
^t Xj^""
I X , and Y be vectors whose elements are the values
of the level of the independent variable, the squares of
that variables and the dependent variable respectively.
Let b be the coefficient of X. taken alone
b be the coefficient of X taken alone
b, be the coefficient of X, when both X, and X are
1 1 1 2
considered together
b- be the coefficient of X when both X^ and X- are
considered together
Then
1 Xi'Y 1 Xj'Y
And
1
_^l V^ 1 1 X^2(2
°1 ^2 Xi'Xi , _ 2 1 I' Xl ' Xi 'J\ : '2
(X^'Xj)^
^ _
(XiX2)2
1 - (X^'X^)(X2'X2) (X.'X.)(X 'X )
1 1 2 2'
When there is a high correlation between X and X the denomina-
tor is close to zero. To the extent that X-^ and X2 correlate differ-
—
^All variables will be treated as deviations from means.
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ently with Y, i.e., to the extent that b2"'"/b is not unity the
numerator differs from zero. Thus the ratio is sensitive to either
small changes in the correlation of X and X or to small changes in
the correlation between X. and Y and \ and Y. In cases where b2
and b^ are approximately equal, b, and b„ will also be close to the
same value.
The standard errors of these slope coefficients are
(X2'X2) 2 2 (>^l'>^2> 2
S^ = =—
=
S. 2—
°E
^1
^ _
(Xt'X2 ) ^ 2 (X^'X2)
'^VV^^2'^2^ '"TVWV
These need not be quite so unstable as the slope coefficients, for
although the denominator is the same as for the slope coefficients
and close to zero, the numerator is not necessarily small as it is
in the case of the slope coefficients. Instability will still be
troublesome to a considerable extent, however, due to the division
by the small denominator.
What occurs in the regressions at hand is that both b^ and
b • are small (= .10 to .20) and scarcely as large as their standard
errors but occasionally b^ and b-^ are much larger (= 10. to 20.),
almost equal, and of opposite sign, with relatively much smaller
standard errors. The sum of b^ and b^, however, is less than
the
standard error of either, implying that taken together the
contribu-
tion of the level and the square is not significant.
Most of the
times when the coefficients of the level and
square of the variable
are significant they have the wrong sign. That
is, they imply that
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paying dividends from a position of no payout increases the capitaliza-
DIVtion rate, but, beyond a point, increasing —— lowers it. This would
PROF
imply an optimal dividend payout rate of unity. Table 3 presents the
frequency with which the coefficients of both the level and square
were significant while Table U presents, for the dividend term, the
set of implied sets of b's and ^'s - the extreme point and the
coefficient of steepness. Negative a_'s imply "inverted" curves with
b locating its maximum, and would lead to a minimization of the
capitalization rate - a maximization of value - at a dividend payout
rate of unity. As can be seen in Table U, when the slope coefficients
on the dividend terms are significant they imply maximum points and
coefficients of steepness that vary quite widely over time. This in-
stability of the extreme points and the steepnesses along with their
questionable implications is taken as evidence that the possibly mis-
leading statistical results which arise from highly correlated
variables mentioned before have in fact occurred.
Because of the intercorrelation and frequent occurrence of
incorrect and unstable signs on the slope coefficients an attempt
was made to redefine the basic variables. The smoothing definitions
were changed to include not just one period on each side of the
current one, but to include two on either side - 5 in total. Thus
the smoothed debt-equity ratio had five terms in both numerator and
denominator as did the dividend-profit ratio. Regressions were run
but the intercorrelation problem was as severe as ever.
Because of
these problems, no further attempt was made to split
the effect of
debt and dividends into two parts.
. ?^1' 1
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TABLE 3
The Frequency With Which Both the Level and the Squared
Terms Had a Significant Sign*
Coefficients of Debt/Equity
Bldg. Mat.
Chemicals
Drugs
Mach.-Ind.
Oils
,DIV ,
P ^s
•Wrong" "Correct"
2
2
1
3
1
,DIV ,
"Wrong"
H
1
2
5
1
"Correct"
2
Coefficients of Dividend/Profit
Bldg. Mat.
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TABLE U
Implied Extreme Point, (a), and Steepness, (b_), from Equations
With Significant Coefficients on Level and Squared Terms
Coefficients of Dividend/Profit
DIV
With —
- + g as independent variable
p s
'^
Bldg. Mat. Chemicals Drugs Mach«-Ind. Oils
b ab a bab a ba
.50 -15.46 .37 4.74 .53 -3.54 .48 4.97 .45 -2.07
,43 -19.80 .51 -3.46 .51 -13.20 .66 3.19 .44 -4.16
.55 -26.06 .51 -1.37 .54 -2.86 .51 -4.64 .69 -2.70
.64 -3.84 .51 -5.90 .54 -4.88 .47 20.03 .58 -1.41
.52 -18.97 .61 -1.17 .49 -5.70 .79 -2.73
.54 -43.54 .50 -3.58 .60 -3.20
.56 -4.17 .90 -4.09
.50 -27.08
.66 -6.61
X
2
1
m
i
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TABLE 4 (Continued)
DIV
With -— + g^ as independent variable
Bldg. Mat. Chemicals Drugs Mach.-Ind. Oils
b ab a bab aba
.58 -6.59 .45 2.57 .57 -2.08 .Ul -1.24 .55 -2.82
.61 -7.05 .61 -1.16 .69 -1.74 .42 -1.79 .58 -2.82
.64 -5.90 .55 -1.74 .58 -3.13 .44 -2.60 .65 -2.04
.65 -2.07 .52 -1.90 .55 -4.34 .44 -2.14 1.04 -.49 j
J
,6'+ -4.22 .55 -1.36 .55 -4.49 .50 -3.14 .79 -.96 5
3
.54 -2.88 .68 -2.52 .95 -.62
.35 2.02
3
C^
.
•':
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These difficulties with the data have the following implications.
The empirical determination of an optimal dividend policy is now
impossible. Having only a linear term in dividends causes the divi-
dend variable to either continually increase or continually decrease
the capitalization rate as the dividend payout rate is increased
depending upon whether the slope coefficient is positive or negative.
Similarly, the estimation of the two-fold effect of debt is no longer
R
possible. Having lost the term ——. as mentioned earlier in this^ ^ R+NI
chapter means that the postulated influence of taxes cannot be main-
tained.
However, further cross section regressions are able to generate
evidence about the influence of growth and whether there is any
influence of debt and dividend policy on the capitalization rate.
Two questions arise with respect to the growth variables. Is it the
long or short-term rate of growth which is capitalized and is there
any influence of growth per se. As for debt and dividends, the
question remains, do they influence capitalization rates at all?
D DIV R
Dropping the terms in the squares of — and J^^t and tne -^^i^
term, the model becomes,
D DIV
1+ g) = r^ log Oo + h(g,-gs) + h'g^ + a
P
log (^ t \ C ^ ) h'gL - + c f^^ + e
Cross section regressions were run for the five industries
with this
specification. Table 5 presents the coefficients of the two
growth
variables when (^ + £3 ) was the dependent variable.
P
rc:t
i
;xfaj
'-:i
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TABLE 5 PART 1 OF 5
Slope Coefficients of Growth Variables in Final
DIVCross Section Specification With (-^- +g ) as Dependent Variable
P s
Building Materials Industry
Year (gr-gs) R*
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
-4.
(.

1953
195^
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TABLE 5 PART 2 OF 5
P s
Chemical Industry
12^ (g^-gg) g^ R*
1948 -5.23 5.34 .972
(.43) (.90) (.967)
1949 -4.74 4.50 .952
(.45) (1.00) (.944)
1950 -6.81 ' 6.12 .926
(.69) (1.02) (.913)
1951 -18.54 14.57 .937
(1.64) (2.39) (.926)
1952 -17.01 13.93 .936
(2.16) (2.87) (.920)
-7.60 ^+.73 .962
(.72) (1.07) (.955)
-4.55 6.16 .955
(.59) (1.16) (.947)
1955 -6.03 7.16
.939
(.80) (1.50) (.929)
1956 -10.70
(1.46)
(1.26)
5.99 .928
(1.17) (1.81) (.916)
1957 -14.48 ll.O:^^ .^21
(1.79) (.907)
iqc:d -12 42 10.86 .957
^^^^ ^^' (2.03) (.9'*9)
*After inclusion of the two growth variables
alone.
,. dt I
.' ItJ.
c>
1950
1952*
1953
1954
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TABLE 5 PART 3 OF 5
Drugs Industry
Year (gL'^s^
1948 -13.57 10.72 .932
(2.19) (2.37) (.906)
1949 -10.51 11.74 .904
(1.63) (3.05) (.874)
-7.97 2.52 .872
(3.67) (7.76) (.818)
23.46 16.15 .932
(6.34) (2.25) (.905)
-9.24 4.97 .892
(2.03) (1.51) (.863)
-U.02 3.60 .952
(.57) (.63) (.943)
1955 -3.67 2.96
.957
(.36) (.'+9) (.9'+8)
1956 -5.10 3.61
.935
(.66) (.66) (.921)
iQc;7 -7 34 7.36 .960
''"
l:ll) (.65) (.952)
1958 -7.63 8.31
.961
( .ll)) (.77) U9b2;
*1951 had insufficient firms as many had highly
negative short tern
rates of growth.
H'ii:.:
':¥CL
n ? 1'
^r -.
£^^:
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TABLE 5 PART U OF 5
,DIV
p s
Machine Industrial
Year (gL'gs) gL ^
1948 -4.76 2.41 .959
(.55) (1.34) (.949)
1949 -4.81 3.85 .941
(.49) (.77) (.927)
1950 -6.40 1.51 .841
(.78) (3.86) (.803)
1951 -4.36 1.91 .907
(.76) (2.70) (.886)
1952 -6.32 6.73 .919
(1.12) (2.64) (.898)
1953 -5.96 6.11 .970
(.47) (.95) (.963)
1954 -5.64 5.02 .966
(.47) (.66) (.958)
1955 -6.53 5.40 .967
(.48) (.93) (.960)
1956 -6.73 5.74 .954
(.80) (1.14) (.943)
1957ft -9.46 7.90 .941
(1.90) (3.40) (.918)
*1958 had insufficient firms as many had highly negative short term
rates of growth.
MT'i
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TABLE 5 PART 5 OF 5
,DIV
,
Oil IndustEL
Year
^^l'^s^
191+8 -3,95 2.69 .9i+6
(.28) (.60) (.938)
1949 -7.64 5.58 .881
(1,01) (1.97) (.863)
1950 -9.47 6.33 .874
(1.12) (2.25) (.848)
1951 -7.57 7.02 .932
(.66) (1.13) (.921)
1952 -10.12 12.33 .899
(1.32) (1.98) (.884)
1953 -9.33 10.25 .871
(1.46) (1.77) (.851)
1954 -8,37 7.35 .939
(.69) (.91) (.930)
1955 -10.87 7.04 .904
(1.26) (1.61) (.890)
1956 -13.16 12.12 .859
(1.80) (2.93) (,829)
1957 -8,87 17.63 .790
(3.95) (13.85) (.706)
1958 -11.63 17.66 .849
(1,26) (3.03) (.803)
n
- 69 -
It can be seen that the coefficient on the difference in the
rates of growth is, as predicted, negative and highly significant.
Also, the coefficient on the long-term growth rate is also significant,
but it is positive. This seems to imply that short-term deviations
from the long-term growth rate are discounted and that high rates of
growth result in lower prices than the model predicts, possibly because
3/
they are thought not to be sustainable,—
Using long-term growth as the element being capitalized, results
in the coefficients shown in Table 6 for the difference between long
and short-term rates of growth. Here the difference does not appear
to have a significant slope coefficient reinforcing the earlier
conclusion that long-term rates of growth determine price.
Because of this lack of significance, the regressions were rerun
on this variable, (— + g^), excluding (gj^ - g^ ) as an independent
variable. Table 7 shows the slope coefficients which resulted, and
Table 8 summarizes the frequency with which debt and dividends had
significant slope coefficients in both these regressions and the
earlier ones run on (^— + g ;.
P s
—'''This latter result will be reversed in later regressions,
'"I •.':
=?\ >, •'
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TABLE 5
DIV
Slope Coefficient of (g -g^) with (-^— + gr )
L S r Ii
as the Dependent Variable
Year Bldg. Mat. Chemicals Drugs Hach.-Ind. Oils
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
Coefficients in brackets are standard errors.
-.54
(.35)
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TABLE 7 PART 1 OF 5
Slope Coefficients When Long Term Growth, Debt/Equity
DIV
and Dividend/Profit Are the Independent Variables and (^— +g^)
^ la
if the Dependent Variable
Building Materials Industry
Year Debt Dividends g R Constant
1948 .20 1.15 6.97 .97 -3.08
(.13)
1949 .17 1,14 7.28 .95 -3.07
(.19)
1950 -.12 1.08 7.32 .95 -3.05
(.18)
1951 -.20 .71 7,74 .93 -2.99
(.21)
1952 .01 .90 7.04 .93 -3.08
(.22)
1955
1955
1957
1958
•{>: i
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TABLE
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1958
TABLE
•''J^jl
71+ -
Year
1918
19U9
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
TABLE 7
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Year Debt Dividends g, R Constant
1948 .18 1,08 5.78 .88 -2.92
(.10)
1949 .32 1.02 5.43 .81 -2.87
(.15)
1950 .31 .95 6.82 .84 -3.00
(.15)
1957
1958
TABLE
"(
(?•;!
,c\'
<
'
t
a
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TABLE 8
Frequency of Significant Coefficients for Debt
and Dividends in Final Cross Section Specification
Coefficients of Debt/Equity
Bldg. Mat.
ll-JiiJ
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The conclusions to be drawn are four; in only two industries,
Drugs and Oils, were debt and dividends significant in a majority of
the cross sections. Long-term growth as the growth element being
capitalized results in more significance for both debt and dividends
DIV
than does short-term growth, the p^p variable is more often signifi-
D
cant than the '— ratio, and growth seems important per se.
The inclusion of growth on both the left and right-hand side of
the regression equation may cause some suspicion of spurious correla-
tion. This usually arises when an independent variable is added to
both sides of a regression equation. If, for example, in the simplest
of cases, y = ax+e is the correct specification, but y+x = a'x+e is
the specification used in the regression, the estimate of oi_' is 1+a
if a is the estimate of a. Thus no real problem need occur in the
estimation of the slopes and the residuals are unchanged. The problem
of spurious correlation arises as the correlation from the second
specification exceeds that in the "true" specification. It is
1 -
Ze?
zy^ + Zx^(a+l)
instead of
1-^
Therefore, if the relationship in this model was really between
loe iHLiL and g. — and -Si^ , the addition of g to both sides would& p °' E PROF
introduce some spurious correlation. However, the model presented
f'.-
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DIV
here states that ("^ + g) » the total yield on the equity, is a con-
stant, unless there is truly some influence of g. That is, if the
DIV
true relationship between (^~" + g) and g is zero, the expected value
DIV
in these regressions of the covariance of ("p"' + g) and g is zero. This
arises from the fact that the model states that high growth rates,
DIV
dividends given, imply just enough higher prices to make (—^ + g)
independent of g. Thus, under this hypothesis, any significant
DIV
correlation between (~p~ + g) and g implies g really influences
(.£=— + g) and does not occur simply because g was included on both
sides of the regression equation,—
— This is analogous to the statement that dividing variables on
both sides of a regression equation by a scale variable introduces
spurious correlation if the model was developed on the unsealed
variables, but not if the model explicitly included the scaled
variables. See for example, J. Meyer and E. Kuh , "Correlation and
Regression When the Data are Ratios," Econometrica . October 1955.
J.f
CHAPTER V
The Pooled Regressions
The cross section regressions have presented some unexpected
results. Little, if any significance can be found for the variables
originally thought to determine capitalization rates, yet high
correlations are obtained, with the growth variable providing almost
all the explanation. Because of these results and also because it
is good econometric practice, the statistical assumptions of the
cross section analysis will be examined to see if they could explain
the peculiar lack of influence for debt and dividend policy.
In this chapter statistical problems with the cross sections
are discovered and the original model is altered to avoid these
problems. The new tests show the implications of the cross section
regressions to be quite misleading and restore one of the independent
variables to a place of importance.
All econometric studies make assumptions about the statistical
properties of the residual or error terms in the equation being
estimated. In time series analysis a major problem with the errors
is that of autocorrelation. This phenomenon has its counterpart in
cross section analysis. The cross sections assumed that the error
terms were independent drawings while in fact each cross section
contained the same firms each year - each drawing. To the extent
that there was any special characteristic associated with a specific
firm, its influence would exist in each of the cross sections, rend-
ering them no longer independent. To test this possibility, residuals
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were compiled for both dependent variables using g , —, ~^~ as
variables to explain ( + g, ) , and g, , (gr-g ), -, -— to explain
P L L *^L <^s • E PROF
DIV DIV
(^T" + gr)* Table 8A shows the results for (—~- + g^ ) . It can be
* Li P L
seen that for many firms, the errors are consistently or predominantly
in one direction in each of the years. In the Building Materials in-
dustry, for example, 12 of the 15 firms have residuals of the same
sign in 10 of the 11 years in which cross sections were run.
Because of the suspicion that effects peculiar to each firm
were present in each of the cross sections, the model was revised to
estimate these influences explicitly. If these effects were substan-
tial, failure to introduce them specifically would result in erroneous
estimates of the standard errors of slope coefficients as well as
effectively overstate the degrees of freedom when evaluating variance
ratios.— It has been shown by A. H, Carter— that altering the
original hypothesis to include a dummy variable for each firm will
eliminate these problems and result in unbiased estimates of the
slope coefficients and error variances. The inclusion of firm effects
requires a method of combining the individual cross sections into one
single grand regression employing all the data. The single regression
estimates at one time all the slope coefficients on the debt, dividend
and growth terms, a set of firm effects, and the slope coefficient r^.
— This problem is discussed more fully in E. Kuh , Capital Stock
Growth: A Macroeconometric Approach , North Holland Publishing Co,
,
1963.
-''ibid.
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The cross section regressions showed that long-term growth as
the element being capitalized gave better results than the short-term
rate» and that when the short-term rate of growth was used it had to
be adjusted to the long-term rate. For this reason, no further
statistical tests will be performed with the short-term rate of
growth and effort will be centered on the long-term rate of growth.
As there is no reason to believe that the difficulties arising from
the colinearity between the level and the square of both the debt
and dividend term would be any less than before, further regressions
will include only the levels of these variables. This means that
few managerial implications will be forthcoming. However, it seems
more serious to find n£ effect for debt and dividend policy in the
cross sections than to be unable to split it into two parts. Thus,
the present tests are run in the hope of discovering a statistically
significant influence for debt and dividends on the capitalization
rate.
The final cross section specification had excluded the difference
between long and short-term rates of growth and was written
DIV D DIV
log (— + g^) = hgL + a^ + c-^P + r^ log po + e
with r, log Po being estimated as the intercept in each of the cross
section regressions. If the data now pooled, log p^ treated as a
time series, and dummy variables introduced as firm effects, the
specification becomes
log(Hl+gL).^^ = r^log Po, + h^ gj^.^^ + %A\^t * ^kt^PROF^kt * h * ^ikt
,M'f!f."
'
L.-
! •
-^i.x
VE
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where
,DIV .
P ^L ikt ,th ^. . ^^ , th
is the capitalization rate for the
• £ • i. 1 -1 firm in the k class m year t.
Po* is the "average" capitalization rate
prevalent in the market at time t.
r, is the industry asset risk adjustment
factor,
^E^ikt Wr^ikt ^Likt "« ^^^ E» ^p ^"^ long-term growth
rate of the i^^ firm in the k class
respectively.
D. is a dummy variable associated with
^, .th c-the 1 firm.
Written this way, the model now attempts to explain the price
of each firm's share as a function of its risk class, the average
capitalization rate for all firms that year, its debt-equity and
dividend-payout ratios, its growth rate, and a constant associated
with that firm. The inclusion of a constant for each firm assures
that the residuals associated with any firm add to zero if summed
over all years. That is, these constants specifically estimate
those peculiarities associated with each firm which are not explained
3/
by the other variables,—
—''if only one slope coefficient for debt and dividends rather
than 11 was allowed, the introduction of dummy variables would be
exactly equivalent to running a regression with all the variables
treated as deviations from firm means.
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Because of the inclusion of the long-term growth rate as an
independent variable, it is necessary to measure all the firm effects
from that of one of the firms. That is, the vector of long-term
growth rates would be a linear combination of the dummy vectors if
each firm were allowed a non-zero dummy. One data vector being a
linear combination of another leads to a singular moment matrix -
a zero determinant - and does not allow the matrix inversion required
to estimate the slope coefficients. Measuring all firm effects as
4/deviations from one firm, does away with the problem.—
This specification requires the addition of another independent
variable - a time series for log po. To this end, the capitalization
rate for all the firms in the k class in the t year was computed.
In year t, log p^ was defined as the average of the average capital-
ization rates for all five industries. It is thus an average of all
the actual capitalization rates. Under perfectly atomistic competition,
although any one firm's rate was included in its computation, it would
compose such a small part of the total that the average rate would
be a truly independent variable uncorrelated with any residual. Al-
though it is difficult to decide if the present conditions approximate
such atomistic competition, the statistical test are performed assuming
the average rate to be a truly independent variable.
—''see D, B, Suits, "Use of Dummy Variables in Regression Equations,"
Journal of American Statistical Association , 1957, Vol. 52, p. 548;
for further comments on the use of dummy variables to test for shift
variable effects.
,!f:i^
-
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Five kinds of results are looked for with this regression.
Does the new specification significantly reduce the residual sum of
squares; what happens to the coefficients of debt and dividends; does
growth still have a strongly positive sign; is it possible to use
the specification to test the hypothesis that the dividend coefficient
depends upon the growth rate; and is it possible to see if the risk
classes actually discriminate between firms with different risk
characteristics?
The pooled regression against which the cross sections were
tested contained the term log p^, one growth variable and eleven
terms - one for each year - for both dividends and debt. Table 9
shows the residual sums of squares associated with each, the F
statistic on their difference and the critical values of the F
distribution for the relevant degress of freedom. It can be seen
that the difference is highly significant implying that the new
specification fits the data significantly better than the old.
Table 10 shows the slope coefficient for the log po term. These
are the industry adjustments to the mean capitalization rate for any
year and are meant to measure the relative riskiness of each industry
and were expected to be around unity - slightly less for the less
risky industries and slightly more for the more risky. They are not
at all as expected. If the average capitalization rate for all
industries is .10, an r, of .33 implies an average rate for that
industry of (.10)'"^'^ or ,465, while a coefficient of 3.25 implies a
cost of less than .001,
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TABLE 9
Residual Sums of Squares — I
Original Pooled*
Cross Sections Regression
.01
.05
Building Equip,
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TABLE 10
Coefficients of Log p (All Firms)
o
Building Equipment -,67 ,UU
Chemicals ,2<5 ,27
Coefficient
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Because the unsuccessful inclusion of this variable may have
interfered with estimation of the other slope coefficients, another
model was considered in which this time variable was not included.
In the new model, each observation on the dependent variable was
treated as the deviation from the year's mean for that industry.
This specification avoids the explanation of the mean price in any
year, and only concerns itself with the deviation of each firm from
the industry mean for that year.
Table 11 compares the residual sums of squares from this regres-
sion with those obtained from the original 11 cross sections. Again,
the introduction of firm effects significantly reduces the residual
error.
In Table 12, the slope coefficient of growth and the dummies are
presented for the equation with the dependent variable as deviations
from year means. The influence of growth is drastically different
from that obtained with the cross sections. In all but one case,
growth now has a large and significantly negative coefficient while
before it always had a positive one. Also, the one positive slope
coefficient is insignificant. A careful examination of the data on
growth, shown in Table 13, reveals that in those industries having
larger coefficients for growth a few firms had growth rates far in
excess of the others. This is especially true in the drug industry.
This led to the presumption that there might be a single data
point or a few data points, far removed from the main cluster of the
data, which were dominating the determination of the slope coefficients.
This also would explain the large positive firm effects which appeared,
\ :
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TABLE 11
Residual Sums of Squares — II
Original Pooled-
.' 5 -,:•
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TABLE 12
Slope Coefficients for Growth and Dummy Variables
Building Mach,
Equip. Chemicals Drugs Ind. Oils
-81.65 -6.74 -7.16
(7.64) (3.19) (.73)
Slope Coef.
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TABLE 12 Continued
rm No,
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TABLE 13
Growth Rates in Total Sample
Building Mach.
m No.
.. •ir-'*
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TABLE 13 Continued
Building Mach.
Firm No, Equip. Chemicals Drugs Ind. Oils
22
.055
.053
23
.068
.094
2^+
.104
25
.059
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especially in the drug industry. For, given a slope coefficient on
growth of -80., a growth rate of. 05, and a relatively small correction
for debt and dividends, the only way to estimate the deviation of
DIVlog (-^— + g) from the industry year mean, which is or order of
magnitude -1 to +1, is to have a large positive constant. Thus, it
was hoped that exclusion of the most rapidly growing firms would
assure that a few firms did not dominate the data on growth.
Table 14 shows the results of a regression in which firms with
growth rates in excess of 10% were excluded. The slope coefficients
are somewhat lower; in all but the drug industry, the firm effects
are smaller. Since these firm effects measure that part of the
deviation of the capitalization rate from the industry year mean
which arises from otherwise unexplained peculiarities, it was expected
that they be a fraction of the total difference. Since the difference
is about one, firm effects of six or seven seemed unreasonable while
those around unity or less seemed more likely to be accurate estimates
of the true firm effects. Thus, except for the drug industry, a
linear approximation for the influence of growth seems to fit the
data well and results in consistent slope coefficients and reasonable
dummies
.
Having found that the very rapidly growing firms tended to dis-
tort the determination of the dummy variables it was thought that the
inclusion of these very rapidly growing firms may have been the reason
for the lack of success in estimating the coefficient rj^. Thus, the
term log Po was reintroduced as a dependent variable and the regres-
sions rerun excluding those firms with growth rates in excess of 10%
r «,M ••
1 o'^ I ; W5 J g
' y. ti
.: r^'liir
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TABLE 14
Slope Coefficients for Growth and Dummy Variables
Building
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TABLE 11+ Continued
Building
Equip. Chemicals Drugs
Mach.
Ind. Oils
Firm No»
18
19
20
21
22
23
.19 •.12
,67
.15
•.21
,38
.28
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per year. The resulting slope coefficients are shown in Table 10,*
Again, as before, the coefficients have too wide a spread to be
considered as risk adjustment factors. Because of this, all further
regressions were run with deviations from industry year mean as the
dependent variable - no further attempt was made to predict that year
mean.
Thus, the first result of the pooled regressions is that they
have reversed the sign of the slope coefficient on the growth term.
The negative slope coefficient on growth implies that the original
model understates the influence of growth on equity prices. In the
original model, as the growth rate increased, the price had to rise
DIV
enough to keep —- + g a constant. The negative sign for growth,
when it is added as an independent variable, means that as growth
increases, the sum of —— + g declines. An increase in the growth
DIV
rate now forces the price to rise more than enough to keep p- + g
constant. This can be stated more succinctly by examining the
derivative of price with respect to the growth rate. If
211 .g = K
P
dP
_
, ^) ^^
dg ^ dg^DT7
dK
. ,„
dK
. ^. -^ • u
When K is a constant,
-r- is zero. When -r- is negative, as it is whendg ag
the slope coefficient on growth is negative, however, the change in P
resulting from the change in g is composed of two terms and causes
dP
dg
H
to be larger than before
*This may be found on page 91,
-•J
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This extra interest in growth in the postwar period may be
evidence of another implication of taxes for the capitalization rate.
Taxes were specifically introduced in connection with the portion of
equity obtained through retentions. No recognition was given to the
fact that the two components of the return - the dividend yield and
the growth in price - were taxed at different rates. Since the gains
tax is always lower than the income tax (except at zero tax rates),
returns obtained through gains should be more valuables If they
were as certain as the dividend income these capital gains are
clearly more valuable. This differential taxation may well explain
a large part of the extra interest in growth.
The fact that the inclusion of these firm effects significantly
reduces residual variance and reverses the sign of the slope co-
efficient on the growth variable attests to the importance of
specifically estimating these firm effects when there is any evidence
of their existence.— Until now, much of the work in the analysis
of covariance has had to be of an analytical nature and the empirical
work has had to make many approximations as the techniques require
the inversion of matrices of large order. Each dummy variable, in
this case each firm effect, increases the order of the matrix by one.
—
'^For example, Myron Gordon in The Investment, Financing and
Valuation of the Corporation , p. 153, reported that one of his industries.
Food, showed "highly significant" evidence of firm effects, but he
performed no analysis specifically including these effects. For a
much more extensive analysis of the whole field of the analysis of
covariance, see A, M, Mood, Introduction to the Theory of Statistics ,
New York? 1950 j or Edwin Kuh , Capital Stock Growth: A Macroeconometric
Approach , North Holland Publishing Co,, 1963,
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so that allowing different slope coefficients for each variable in
each year and estimating firm effects required the inversion of
matrices of order 40-50, With an original equation containing 3 or
4 variables, 25 firms and 10 years, the order could easily reach
80-90, and often much more. While computational problems of time
and accuracy have been unsurmountable in the past, the availability
of a very high speed computer with a large memory capacity such as
the IBM 7090 has made the work in this thesis possible. Also the
moment matrices for dummy regressions are relatively easy to parti-
tion so that inversion routines could be developed using present
machine capacity to invert rapidly and accurately the matrices
necessary for a regression for say, UO firms in each of 20 years with
5 variables in the equation.
As stated in Chapter II, it has been conjectured that it is likely
that the equity price of a rapidly growing firm would suffer more from
dividend payments than that of a more slowly growing one. This effect
is thought to occur if rapid rates of growth imply high profitability
of investment. Retained earnings would thus generate large capital
gains which because of the differential taxation of income and capital
gains would be more valuable than dividends. The present model specifi-
cation allows a rather neat test of this hypothesis. It may be for-
mulated in the following manner.
Let the slope coefficient of the dividend profit rate depend upon
u • 1 DIV
growth, being larger for larger rates of growth, i.e., let a -—
DIV DIV ,DIV
become (a+bg^)
—
^ = a
-^^ + hg^-'^^y.
I'!i Vi'.l
Since this results in the old specification plus the term bg ,*—
,
L PROF
it is possible to perform an F test for the significance of an added
variable,—
Table 15 shows the coefficients and the result of the F test for
each of the industries. Three times the interaction is significant
at at least the 5% level. In all but one case, it has the predicted
positive sign, causing the price to fall as the product of growth
rate and dividend payout rises.
In addition to increasing the explanatory power of the model for
. . . . .
^DIV
, .
. ^, ^
DIV
,
certain industries, the term g^rrTr, alters the influence of ^rrr inPROF rRUr
DIV
these industries. In Oils, adding g''^ changes the coefficient on
alone from positive to negative, in industrial machinery the
PROF
coefficient, initially negative, is made more negative and in drugs
a mixed coefficient is made much more stable and negative in all but
one year. Table 15 A shows the slope coefficients with and without
the inclusion of g*—— , This increase in stability and significance
PROF
of the coefficient of .2i— brought about by the inclusion of the term
PROF
g-w^ is taken as further evidence of the validity of the interaction.
PROF
Thus far, three of the hypotheses which were advanced on page 89
have been tested. There are substantial firm effects, their omission
did lead to a misestimate of the influence of growth and, finally,
^^In the analysis of the cross sections it was difficult to
measure significance except in terms of standard errors, but this
single grand regression enables the easy inclusion and exclusion of
sets of variables facilitating F tests on the differences of variances,
and allows more complete statements to be made concerning statistical
significance.
.'
•-* >_'
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TABLE 15
Significance of the Slope Coefficient for g's—
-
Building Material
Chemicals
Drugs
Machinery-Industrial
Oils
Coefficient
H"--.
- 106
TABLE 15A
DIVCoefficients of j^^ With and Without the Inclusion
.DIV
of g'^rrrrr as an Independent Variable
r RUx
Drugs
Mach.
Ind. Oils
w/o w w/o w/o
1948
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there is a significant interaction between growth and the dividend
payout. Before moving on to the remaining two hypotheses, it is
useful to look more carefully at the influence of growth and the
interaction between growth and dividends.
In order to see if there was any change in the importance of
growth or the interaction of growth and dividends over the eleven
years for which data were available, the regressions were rerun
including eleven coefficients for both the growth and the growth
times dividend payout rate - one for each year. The resulting co-
efficients were then examined to determine if the influences showed
evidences of changing over time.
In only two industries did the estimation of one slope coefficient
DIV
per year for the term g»^=—— significantly reduce the error variance
below that obtained when only one slope coefficient for all years was
allowed. Table 16 shows the time series of slope coefficients for
the g'':^i— term for these two industries. In both cases, the differ-
PROF
ence arises from smaller coefficients in 1948 and 1949 with essential-
ly similar ones in the other years. It appears that the joint influence
of growth and dividends was not so strong in the immediate postwar
years as it was later on. This is consistent with the differential
tax explanation, if one believes it took several years to be assured
that personal taxes would after the war remain at their relatively
high levels and would not fall to pre-war levels.
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TABLE 16
Coefficients of gi*=—
PROF
Coefficients of g
19U8
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
Chemicals
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With the hope of learning more about the behavior over time of
the response to the growth variable, a similar regression was run
allowing instead of one, eleven coefficients for growth - one each
year. Of the four industries in which the growth variable yielded
reasonable estimates, Building materials and industrial machinery
showed no evidence of a change over the period. For oils, the slope
coefficient of the growth term was somewhat higher in the immediate
postwar period than later but showed little change after 1950,
Chemicals, however, had a quite different pattern. The coefficient
moved from between -2 and -3 in the beginning of the period to +.5
II
in 1954 and then returned to the range -1 to -2 in the last years,—
Except for the chemical industry, there seems little change in the
slope coefficient over time. This result is consistent with the feel-
ing that the interest in growth per se arises from the differential
taxation of income and capital gains. Since this tax differential
did not change drastically over the period, one wouldn't expect the
8/
interest in growth to change.—
Z/conceming the results in the chemical industry, these may well
arise from differences of opinion during the period as to the long-
term growth rate. Although earnings had grown sharply from igue to
1950, there was considerable concern in 1952 and 1953 that the reduced
military requirements were producing a buyer's market while the industry
had considerable excess capacity, (See, for instance, "Facts, Fears,
and the Future," K, H. Klipstein, Chemical and Engineering News , May U,
1963, pp, 1854-1856.) In fact, earnings did not perform as well in the
years 1951 through 1954 as they had in the earlier period or as they
did in the latter part of the period. The "bearish" outlook in the
early 1950's may have led to a discounting of the expected long-term
rate of growth. If the growth rates actually being capitalized were
less than those used in the regressions with the most rapidly growing
firms being the most highly discounted, the positive slope coefficients
for growth found in the regressions would be explained.
£'^ Rising income levels and a progressive tax system do result in
higher average personal tax rates, but this effect is not thought too
serious in the present connection.
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This concludes the analysis of the influences of growth and the
growth-payout rate interaction. There is some evidence that the
interaction was more important after 1950 than before, while there
is little evidence that the influence of growth alone changed over
the period.
Having explored the influences of growth and the product of
growth and dividend payout, the significance of the dividend payout
was next tested. In chemicals and drugs it was found not to contri-
bute significantly to the explanation of the dependent variable. In
DIV
the three other industries, however, —— does contribute significantly.
In oils and industrial machinery it has a negative sign implying divi-
dends alone (not including their interaction with growth) raise equity
prices. In building materials, however, the sign is positive implying
dividends reduce equity prices in that industry. Table 15A gives an
indication of the size of these dividend coefficients.
The next move was to remove the — ratio from the regression to
allow a test for the significance of its inclusion. In only two
industries did the residual variance obtained by including the debt-
equity ratio differ significantly from that obtained without use of
the — termo These were building materials and oils. In both, the
coefficient was negative implying that equity prices rose as the —
ratio rose.
At this stage a recapitulation and some analysis is necessary to
avoid too much confusion from all the tests. The first problem was
to see if the pooled regressions did a better job of explaining the
data than did the individual cross sections. The conclusion was an

- Ill -
unqualified yes. There was significant evidence of substantial firm
effects. Then the interaction of growth and dividend payout was
tested and three industries, chemicals, industrial machinery, and
oils showed significant evidence of such an effect. The sign of
this influence agreed with the a priori belief. When this influence
was allowed to vary over the period, chemicals and oils gave evidence
of a slight increase over the period in the penalty attached to a
high growth firm paying out a large fraction of its earnings as divi-
dends. When the influence of growth was allowed to vary over the
period it was found that building materials and industrial machinery
showed no evidence of change. There was only a slight increase over
time in this influence in the oil industry. The chemical industry,
however, showed considerable variation over the period. This varia-
tion was thought to have arisen from the unsettled outlook for
continued earnings growth after the Korean War. After exploring the
influence of growth, both by itself and in conjunction with the
dividend payout, the partial influence of the dividend payout alone
was examined. In three cases, building materials, industrial machinery
and oils, it contributed significantly to the results. For two of
these industries, the partial influence of dividends increased share
prices.
The test, which is in some ways the most crucial of all, was
then performed - the test for the significance of debt. If the in-
dustries chosen truly represented a risk class in the sense discussed
in Chapter II, there was the strong presumption that higher debt-equity
ratios would imply lower equity prices. This would arise either from
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increasing financial risk or from some sort of arbitrage process
keeping the value of the firm from being completely dependent on the
9/
capital structure,— The results showed, however, that only in two
industries did debt add significantly to the analysis. Building
materials and oils were the two, and the sign was opposite to that
predicted in both. Earlier, mention had been made of the fact that
if the industries chosen did not represent risk classes there would
be the problem that high-debt firms may not be firms with high
financial risk as much as firms with low physical asset risk. This
appears to be the case in these industries.
Still rejecting, on a priori grounds, the hypothesis that debt
does not influence equity prices, the evidence that it does not add
significantly to the explanation of capitalization rates in the
chemical, drug and industrial machinery industries and has the wrong
sign in the building materials and oil industries casts doubt on the
validity of the assumption that these industry classifications contain
firms with common enough risk characteristics to be useful as a risk
class. This is not to say that there are no purposes for which an
industry classification as a broad measure of risk would be useful,
but that it appears that industry is an inadequate proxy for risk
when the influence of debt on equity prices is to be separated from
the influence of the riskiness of the physical assets in which the
firm invests.
—'^ There was the thought that a kind of arbitrage process as dis-
cussed in Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller's "The Cost of Capital,
Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment" might be operative
even in a world of growth, taxes and risky debt.
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One may well quarrel with this interpretation. We have said
that, since debt should have a positive coefficient and was found
not to have one, the industries must not be risk classes. An alter-
nate view could be that they truly are risk classes and debt has no
influence on equity prices. Although there is only inferential and
no direct evidence, the first view seems more likely.
Having said that the risk class-industry connection was a poor
one for estimating the influence of debt on capitalization rates,
one is left with the question of its usefulness in estimating the
influences of growth and dividends. Here again the answer is more
difficult to give.
One test can be performed, however, to help determine if there
is any difference among the industries. This is not a test to see
if the firms within an industry have identical risk characteristics
but rather a test to see if there is any difference among industries.
It concerns the average capitalization rate each year. If average
capitalization rates for all industries showed no variation in any
given year it would seem likely that the industry classification
scheme was not able to discriminate carefully among firms. If,
however, it could be shown that the average capitalization rate
differed from industry to industry, this information could be taken
.1 '.'^ 1
!j.7:.'
\ ' :•:• I
- IIU -
as inferential evidence that there was some merit in the classifica-
tion system. For, although the classes may not be homogeneous within,
they are at least heterogeneous with respect to each other.i£/
The test performed was a standard analysis of variance with a
two way classification,—^^ The data were arrayed in a matrix with
industries across the top and years down the side. As there was the
presumption that year means would vary across years, the test was to
determine if there was a significant difference between rows (years)
and columns (industries). Table 17 shows the results. With very
high confidence, the assumption that there is no difference between
industries is rejected. Similarly, the years appear to be different,
as suspected. This conclusion supports the belief that the indus-
try classes while perhaps not satisfying the criterion that firms
within be homogeneous with respect to risk, at least satisfy the
assumption that there is a difference between the classes.
Aside from this evidence that the industries were not identical
to each other, the reliability and stability of the results obtained
should also be considered when evaluating the classification scheme.
In three industries there is a significant contribution arising from
i2.'As many variables influence the capitalization rate a
classification scheme able to discriminate extremely well with respect
to risk might effectively group firms into risk classes, but these
firms could have other characteristics making their capitalization
rates equal on the average to those in another risk class. This exact
counterbalancing of other influences against physical asset risk
appears highly unlikely, however,
ii'^See A, Mood, Introduction to Statistics , p. 331 for a lucid
explanation of both the theory and the practice of analysis of
variance tests.
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TABLE 17
Analysis of Variance of Mean Capitalization Rates
Degrees F
Source Sums of Squares of Mean Square Ratio
Freedom
Mean
Year Effect
Ind, Effect
Deviations
Total
242,29135
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the g*—— term and in four it has the correct sign. This term also
PROF
increases the importance and renders more stable the influence of
£— alone as attested by Table 15A, Thus this interaction seems
PROF
quite well documented. Also the coefficient of growth, when both
—
. and g'w— are included, is significantly negative in four of
PROF PROF .
s J B
the five cases. This result is taken as substantial evidence that
the original model understated the influence of growth on equity
prices.
Thus, although we conclude that the industries are not homo-
geneous enough risk classes to enable estimating the influences of
debt, the analysis has shown four things. Cross section analysis
appears to have serious shortcomings because of substantial firm
effects, ii.' Pooled regressions seem to be a much more efficient
and appropriate way of approaching the problem of explaining capital-
ization rates over time and between firms. That the original model
understated the influence of growth and that high payout ratios along
with rapid growth penalize stock prices also seem to be substantiated.
In addition, there is some evidence that dividends apart from their
interaction with growth raise equity prices.
ii,/with this in mind, and with Gordon's recognition of potential
firm effects in "The Investment, Financing and Valuation of the Corpo-
ration," his results should be interpreted with caution.

CHAPTER VI
Implications of the Model and of the Statistical Tests
This chapter spells out the managerial implications of the
original model and contrasts these with the influences statistically
estimated. It conludes that the major findings of the thesis are
methodological and concern the variables which ought to be included
and the types of test which seem relevant for further examination
of the influence of risk, growth and taxes on share prices.
As originally formulated, the model had important managerial
implications. It prescribed a dividend policy and a debt-equity mix
which would maximize the value of the firm. This is best seen by
considering the weighted average cost of capital implied by the
original model. Let c/c be defined as this weighted average. Then
c/c =
°
with D and E being debt and equity, while r and p are
D+E
the interest rate and the capitalization rate respectively.
The capitalization rate was hypothesized as
.
. Dv2
,
,
DIV 9. R
r^
[a(b--) + c(d-—p,) ] j^
(3) p = (Po) "^ e f
If, in the context of raising a given amount of equity, it is desired
DIV . .
to determine that rTT- which minimizes p, it is possible to rewritePROF
this as:—
i^R has been written as (1-f^p). the retention rate, times
aggregate profits represented as I'".
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^ PROF^ ^^-^"PROF^ R+NI
p = K e f
DIV
as these are the only elements which depend on . This yields a
PROF
minimum (— ) of
PROF
PROF 2 c R+NI
DIVSince f IS less than unity, log f is negative and
-rrr^* is less
than d by an amount proportional to the income tax gains available
through retentions. If, however, large amounts of new issues have
to be sold because profits provide only a small part of total desired
equity, the old stockholders have to forego some of the gains of
retentions in order to raise the equity price to dilute their share
in the equity as little as possible while obtaining the new equityo
The model is also useful to determine that — ratio which
minimizes the cost of capital. If we assume the total of D and E
to be fixed and seek to find the optimal portion of debt, it is
necessary to differentiate c/c with respect to debt, imposing the
2/
constraint that dD = -dE,— This yields
d c/c f. - ,, D,,, D
dD
= r-p{l+2a(l-Hi^)(b-^)}
dD = -dE ^ ^
Being quadratic in — , this expression has two zeros — that is, there
are two extreme points. Only one of these has any real meaning,
2/ • •
— A somewhat similar approach is adopted by E. Kuh in "Capital
Theory and Capital Budgeting," Metroeconomica , December, 1960,
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however, as the other implies that a maximum cost of capital is
3/
obtained at a negative debt-equity ratio,—
If it had been possible to estimate the model in its original
form, it would be useful to explore the implications for (=•)" of
changes in a^ and b_» However, the expression for (—)''• is quite
complicated and having no estimates of a and b gives such an
analytic exploration little use<,
As estimated, however, the model does not contain all the terms
in equation (3), Rather, it has become
(a+b,)2II eg,
p = K e S^ PROF ^
^L
with the coefficients a and b significant in three of five industries,
and c in four of the five.
The .2LX, variable enters linearly, not quadratically , in the
PROF
logarithm of Pc This makes the •r—r which minimizes log (-^- + g)
DIV , .
be either zero or unitVc It is zero if —— has a positive sign as
PROF
— Setting
d(c/c )
dD = -dE equal to zero results in a quadratic
expression for (—)*, To see where this expression has zeros, it is
necessary to note that when w is zero, the function has a negative
value o For large ^, the function is clearly positive. With a little
thought it can be seen that if a quadratic function is non-zero,
has a negative value at zero, and a positive slope for large value
of the variable, one of its zeros must be left of the origin. This
being the case, only one of the zeros of ^ ^/
'^
-
implies a positive
(£)* and this (^)" must be a minimum.
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then dividends continually lower price and it is unity if —— has*^
,
-' PROF
a negative sign. The magnitude of the sign is (a + bg) with a
negative and b_ positive. As stated before, high growth makes
dividends less valuable.
If the data on ——^ had been more accurate and had led to a
R+NI
reliable estimate of log f , the difficulty still would not be
resolved. For then the derivative of log (—— + g) with respect
to £ijL would be a + bg -log f , This is still a constant -
PROF R+NI
DIV
not a function of —— - and thus still prescribes a polar
PROF ^ ^
dividend policy.
The policy suggestion for dividends from the present model is
not too unreasonable for rapidly growing firms as it prescribes no
dividends at all, but for those growing at less rapid rates, the
DIV
conclusion that continual increases in —— would increase equity
PROF
prices seems unreasonable. Dividends were thought to be valuable
because they could produce more steady income than capital gains
and also avoided the transaction costs involved in claiming capital
gains. As the payout rate becomes larger and larger, the differen-
tial between the income tax and the capital gains tax rates should
overwhelm any interest in dividends arising from these two sources,
DIV
Any possible counterbalancing effect at high ^^p ratios was lost
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when the (7—'_) term was indistinquishable from the ^ryrr. term itself,PROF rRCJr
Losing this term caused the loss of any reasonable managerial
application in the field of dividend decisions.—
Since the influence of debt was either non-existent or was
thought to arise from the heterogeneity of risk within the industry
groups, no managerial implications at all are forthcoming in this
area.
Although, it seems that problems with the data and with the
formulation have kept the model from attaining certain of its
original goals, it is useful to examine one further aspect of the
final specification. These are the estimates of the elasticities
of share price with respect to the growth rate and the dividend
payout rate.
The final specification was
which implies
DIV
div,i,3^""^^l>TTO/2l_
^L
-/Adding the term bg. 'f' ~^„ to the original specification would
J-j r Rur
DIV
PROF
r: , log f Ztt b
have led to an optimal —- of d + ^^ ^^^ " Tc" ^
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Altering the growth rate has three influences on share prices, one
from the e term, one from the e ^ term and one from the
-g^ term. Thus, computing the elasticity of price with respect to
growth Insults in the three terms shown in Table 18. This elasticity
computation is useful to determine the relative size of the different
influences of growth on share prices. The effect of the interaction
of growth and payout rate is about one-half as large (and opposite
in sign) as the other two influences of growth. Thus, the total
elasticity of share price with respect to growth is substantially
diminished by this interaction.
It is also possible to compute the elasticity of share price
with respect to the payout ratio. These results are presented in
Table 18, Again, it can be seen that although dividends by them-
selves raise share prices, the joint influence of the growth rate
and the payout rate is considerable. For the oil industry, this
interaction is sufficient to make the net effect of increasing the
dividend payout be a reduction in share prices.
These elasticities should be interpreted with care for, as has
been said many times, the final specification is not thought to in-
clude all the influences of the independent variables. The slope
coefficients measured are the best estimates available of the effects,
but there is the strong belief, for instance, that the one coefficient
which resulted for the payout rate measures the composite of both the
originally hypothesized effects. This being the case, the estimates
of the elasticities should be treated as only gross indications of
the magnitude of the influences of the dividend payout or share prices.
Similar reservations apply to the growth elasticities.
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TABLE 18
Elasticities
Growth Elasticities
Industrial Mach,
Oils
Total
.504
1,325
-Sl
,785
1,572
e
.32U
,733
,605
•o9 80
Dividend Payout Elasticities
Total
DIV
PROF
,.DI V
^^'PROF
Industrial Macho
Oils
,607
•,420
1,212
,570
-,605
-.990
Building Materials was excluded from this table as it had no
DIV
significant effect for the g-'»~r term; Chemicals because there was
no significant effect of growth; and Drugs because the slope coef-
ficients for both the dummies and the growth term remained quite
large even with the elimination of the most rapidly growing firms,
casting doubt on the validity of these estimates.
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Concerning the influence of taxes, the results are mixed. The
differential between the income tax and the capital gains tax led to
the hypothesis that the variable should have a negative influence
on the capitalization rate. The size of this coefficient was to de-
pend on the magnitude of the difference between these two tax rates.
This influence could not be substantiated. The feeling was that this
lack of positive results arose from difficulties with the data and
should not be taken as evidence that no such effect existed. The
influence of growth per se , however, was taken as evidence of an
effect on share prices of the differential between the income and
gains tax. The fact that the capitalization rate fell as the
growth rate increased was thought to arise from a greater interest
in price appreciation than in dividend payments. Thus although
taxes did not enter as originally expected, they did show some
effect in the final specification.
This concludes the analysis of the results of both the cross
section regressions and the pooled regressions. Few of the
originally specified managerial implications can be found. Every-
thing is not lost, however. The interaction of high growth and
high dividend payouts which had been discussed elsewhere has been
substantiated, along with evidence that the original model understated
the total influence of growth.
The implication of the interaction between the growth rate and
the dividend payout rate as well as the greater interest in price
appreciation than in dividends is that there is a bias toward the
retention of earnings created by the differential between the income
ll . ) '
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tax and the capital gains tax. This tax induced bias shifts the
allocation of saving more toward that by corporations and may in-
duce a different composition of investment than would occur under
a different tax law. Such a statement, however, is more academic
than realistic, as a change in the gains - income tax relationship
would have so many influences on both saving and investing habits
that to measure just this one effect would give no estimate of the
direction of the net change, let alone its amount.
Also, in a quite different vein, the evidence that short-
term deviations from long-term rates of growth were discounted
implies that the market has good enough forecasting ability to
stabilize price movements in the face of fluctuating short-term
growth rates.
Rather than managerial or macroeconomic implications , what do
seem to be forthcoming from this thesis are some indications of
the kinds of variables with which further research into the in-
fluences of debt, dividends, taxes and growth on stock prices must
be concerned. These are the emphasis on dummy variable regressions
which allow for firm effects and the avoidance of cross section
analysis, along with an extreme interest in growth, both alone and
in connection with the sr^p variable.
Most importantly, there is the need for a much better way of
dealing with risk in order to measure the influence of debt. This
last requirement seems to be the most difficult of all, especially
given the difficulty Gordon had with variance of earnings, and that
encountered by Holland and Cootner in defining a risk variable.
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Both these studies attempted to find a variable associated with
each firm which measured its risk. Neither claimed much success.
The alternate approach adopted here yielded no more, and worse than
that, implied that until the problem was adequately treated, the
influence of debt could not be measured.
Aside from this problem, at least three others need to be ex-
plored. The attempted use of the average market capitalization rate
with an industry adjustment for risk proved unsuccessul. Some way
should be found to avoid having to estimate deviations from industry
means. Also, the dummy slope coefficients should be analysed to
determine what influences they measure. Finally, the data on
were thought to be poorly adapted to the hypothesis. Since the
tests were run, it has been suggested that a better estimate of
internal versus external equity could have been obtained by simply
adding up retentions in the period as the interval funds, and sub-
tracting this total from the total increase in equity to obtain the
estimate of external funds. This would avoid many of the various
accounting practices applying to stock dividends, swaps, and
revaluations ,—
L'^The Studley-Shupert data make such an analysis possible, and
it will form a part of the author's further research in this area.
I* .T-6*
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